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COMMENT
GATT and the Half-Life of Uranium
Industry Protection
"But further, said I, it is practically impossible to establish the city in a
region where it will not need imports."1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act of 19542 to au-
thorize the private ownership of nuclear fuel to promote the development
of a civilian nuclear power industry.' By promoting vigorous civilian
demand for domestically mined uranium, Congress attempted to assure
the viability of the domestic uranium producers, which in turn would
assure the availability of a domestic supply for the military.4 Because
natural uranium must be enriched prior to its use in either the civilian or
defense sector, and because the United States Atomic Energy Commis-
sion ("AEC") ran what was then the sole enriching operation in the free
world, the domestic uranium industry could be protected from foreign
competition by restricting enrichment.5 Congress thus authorized the
AEC to restrict enrichment of foreign-source uranium destined for do-
mestic end use "to the extent necessary to maintain the viability of the
1 PLATO, REPUBLIC in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 370:e (E. Hamilton & H.
Cairns eds. 1961).
2 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2282 (1982 & Supp. 1987))[hereinafter AEA of 1954].
3 The 1964 amendments added subsection (v) to § 161 of the AEA of 1954. Private Ownership
of Special Nuclear Materials Act, Pub. L. No. 88-489, § 16, 78 Stat. 602, 606 (1964)(codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2201(v)(1982))[hereinafter § 161(v)].
4 See Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials, 1964: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1964)[hereinafter 1964
Hearings].
5 See infra notes 27-31 and notes 41-59 and accompanying text, for discussion of the uranium




These restrictions on international trade conflicted with the United
States' trade obligations imposed by its membership in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).7 Despite an inauspicious be-
ginning8 and some controversy as to whether it is law in the United
States, 9 GATT is the dominant framework controlling the flow of goods
across international borders.' 0 Although the members of GATT, known
as Contracting Parties, have not always adhered to the Agreement's
terms, they realize the enormous potential for mutual gains through
trade. As a result, the GATT relationship has persisted. 1
GATT generally requires that each Contracting Party assure equal
opportunity for goods of all Contracting Parties, including domestic
products.12 This "most favored nation" ("MFN") principle requires,
with many exceptions, that advantages accorded to products originating
in or destined for one Contracting Party be granted to similar products
coming from or going to all other Contracting Parties.)' As of 1987,
6 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v).
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, A7
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (effective Jan. 1, 1948)[hereinafter GATT].
8 GATT was originally intended to be the operational framework, or controlling "contract," of
a United Nations sponsored, multi-nation mercantile body called the International Trade Organiza-
tion. The ITO never advanced beyond the negotiating stage, however, largely because the United
States refused to join. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 49-53 (1969)[hereinaf-
ter J. JACKSON]. The GATT contractual relationship survived, however, and has been established in
practice as an independent entity, albeit weaker than intended. See Jackson, GATT and Recent
International Trade Problems, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 8-9 (1987)[hereinafter Jackson, Re-
cent Problems].
9 See Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66
MICH. L. REV. 249, 280-90 (1967)[hereinafter Jackson, GA 7-' and Domestic Law]. Congress never
enacted GATT into law, and the United States and the other signatories have proceeded under the
agreement only provisionally. Protocol of Provisional Application, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1948).
10 0. LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 4-6
(1985). "GATT is at the same time a legal framework for the conduct of trade relations between its
member countries, a forum for trade negotiations and for the adaptation of its legal framework, and
an organ for conciliation and settlement of disputes." Id. at 5.
11 The GATT framers believed that free trade was the key to efficient resource allocation and
world prosperity. GATT, supra note 7, Preamble, para. 2. It was also hoped that GATIT-controlled
trade would promote political cooperation and peace. K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 12 n.5 (1970)). See generally Abbott, Linking Trade to Political
Goals: Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970s and 1980s, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739, 853-54
(1981)[hereinafter Abbott].
12 See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 255.
13 See GAIT, supra note 7, art. I(l). The article provides: "With respect to customs duties and
charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation ... any advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded... to the like product originating in or destined for
the territories of all other contracting parties."
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GATT membership included ninety-six Contracting Parties. These, and
the additional twenty-eight countries which abide by GATT principles in
conducting trade, account for over 80% of world trade in goods.14 Ura-
nium producers that are both GATT members and U.S. suppliers include
Canada, Australia, South Africa, Gabon, and Niger. 5 From 1967 to
1987, domestic utilities purchased 106.8 million pounds of uranium
abroad and committed to purchase an additional 109.5 million pounds
over the next several years. Domestic producers have exported 62 mil-
lion pounds over the same period and are committed to sell an additional
12.2 million pounds. 6 Since virtually all U.S. trade in uranium is with
GATT members, it is important to reconcile U.S. defense policy for ura-
nium -with GATT.
The uranium enrichment restriction, though technically in violation
of the GATT prohibition against differing "national treatment," 17 was
intended to afford temporary protection to an industry recently emanci-
pated from defense control.' I It was also possible that in 1964 the re-
striction fit within GATT's exception from nondiscriminatory trade
policies for trade in goods affecting national security. 9 The AEC en-
forced 100% enrichment restrictions from 1969 to 1977, and phased out
the restrictions from 1977 to 1984.20
Current uranium market conditions, however, reflect a separation
between civilian and defense supply markets. Australia and Canada, two
reliable U.S. allies with substantial proven uranium reserves, supply most
of the needs of the U.S. civilian reactor program with less expensive,
higher grade ore than is available in the United States.21 Continued im-
ports from Canada, by far the largest supplier to the United States, are
assured by the recently enacted Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment ("FTA").22 Moreover, neither exporter permits its uranium to be
used for defense purposes, allowing allocation of all domestic production
14 See THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES 1987, at 118-19 (1988)[here-
inafter GATT ACTIVITIES 1987]; see also F. STONE, CANADA, THE GATT AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE SYSTEM 23 (1984).
15 GATT ACTIVITIES 1987, supra note 14, at 118-20.
16 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, URANIUM INDUSTRY ANN. 1987
66 (1988)[hereinafter URANIUM ANN.].
17 GATT, supra note 7, art. III. But see S. REP. No. 1325, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1964),
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3105, 3121 [hereinafter 1964 REPORT]. For
more on uranium and national treatment, see infra notes 182-190 and accompanying text.
18 URANIUM ANN., supra note 16, at 2.
19 GATT, supra note 7, art. XXI. See infra notes 203-208 and accompanying text.
20 Foreign Uranium for Domestic Use: Modification of Restrictions on Enrichment, 39 Fed.
Reg. 38,016-17 (1974)[hereinafter Modification of Restrictions].
21 See infra notes 256-259 and accompanying text.
22 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, - U.S.T. -,
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to the military, if necessary. Defense needs can also be satisfied for sev-
eral years by a substantial government uranium stockpile, and if the
stockpile becomes depleted, now-dormant domestic sources can be
called back into production with adequate warning. The utilities also
maintain significant stockpiles to draw upon. Since civilian and military
uranium needs are assured through individual sources,23 the GATT na-
tional security exception, if it ever applied, does not currently apply to
uranium imported for civilian use.24
The uranium market can never truly be "free," however. Because
uranium has few metallurgical uses, and because there is a real danger of
weapons-grade uranium falling into irresponsible hands,25 non-prolifera-
tion restraints and tight safety regulation are required on uranium
trade.26 Nevertheless, this Comment will show that civilian uranium
trade policy can be formulated to resolve the tension between GATT,
and military security and nonproliferation interests.
The international uranium supply markets for both the U.S. nuclear
utilities and its national defense are sufficiently distinct that the move-
ment of uranium and provision of enrichment services for the civilian
nuclear power industry can now be governed by international commodity
T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter FTA]. See infra notes 105-126 and accom-
panying text.
23 See Section IV infra for detailed discussion.
24 See infra notes 223-230 and accompanying text.
25 Former President Kountch& of uranium-rich Niger stated in 1982 that he would sell mineral
wealth "even to the devil." Niger's uranium customers have included Libya, Pakistan, Iraq, and
Algeria. Woodsworth, How Niger's Uranium Boom Lost its Glitter, Fin. Times, Sept. 21, 1988, at 6,
co. l[hereinafter Woodsworth].
26 Enriched uranium can be used as an explosive with additional enrichment. N. Moss, THE
PoLMTcs OF URANIUM 21 (1981). Currently, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great
Britain, China, and India are known to have nuclear weapons, but other countries are suspected of
possessing them. See generally Schwartz, Controlling Nuclear Proliferation: Legal Strategies of the
United States, 20 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L BUS. 1 (1988). The United States, the Soviet Union, and two
European consortia currently have enrichment capability. Brazil, Japan, and others are on the verge
of developing this capability. See infra note 65. The need to stanch the spread of nuclear weapons
and the capability to make them became a pressing concern in the 1960s, resulting in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty of 1967. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for sig-
nature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. This treaty recognized the-
"links between nuclear energy and weapons" and thus also restricted trade in uranium feed material
and enrichment technology. Treverton, Introduction, in ENERGY AND SECURITY 2 (G. Treverton
ed. 1980)[hereinafter G. TREVERTON].
In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency, of which the United States is a member, was
created to monitor and safeguard the use of nuclear materials. Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, opened for signature Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S.
3. The third major prong of the U.S. nonproliferation effort is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (1978)(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-32 (1982 & Supp. V
1987); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2160(a) (1982)), in response to India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion in
1974 and to other loopholes in U.S. law. Schwartz, supra, at 2-3, 28-29.
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trade norms without jeopardizing national defense. The United States
thus can no longer sidestep the operation of GATT in this area.
Section II of this Comment describes the protection of the uranium
industry through enrichment restrictions and the concurrent uranium
market distortions. The section then examines the subsequent relaxation
of enrichment restrictions during the 1980s and the futility of attempts to
reimpose restrictions on civilian uranium trade. Section III demon-
strates how enrichment and other trade restrictions negatively interact
with GATT and concludes that the national security exception is inappli-
cable. Section IV illustrates the distinction between the civilian and mili-
tary markets, holding that uranium trade can now be governed by
GATT.
II. URANIUM INDUSTRY PROTECTION
Uranium is a naturally occurring, silvery-white radioactive metal27
with several isotopes, only one of which (U235) is readily fissionable and
thus usable as reactor fuel.28 Ores of uranium contain less than one per-
cent U235 and in order to be usable as fuel, this concentration must be
enhanced to between three and four percent. 29 To do so, the ore is first
milled,3° and then the fissionable isotope is concentrated by one of sev-
eral means of enrichment. 1
27 Uranium is relatively common among crustal elements, occurring in such minerals as pitch-
blende, coffinite, and carnotite. Commercially mined deposits appear in Arizona, Colorado, New
Mexico, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. URANIUM ANN., supra note 16, at 3.
28 Uranium has an atomic number of 92, which means that there are 92 protons in the nucleus of
an uranium atom. See Periodic Table of the Elements. The isotope U2s has 235 nucleons, or 92
protons and 143 neutrons. Nuclei of other isotopes, by definition, have differing numbers of neu-
trons, but the constant, identifying number of protons. See I. KAPLAN, NUCLEAR PHYSICS 197-98
(1975)[hereinafter I. KAPLAN]. Uranium fission occurs when U235 is bombarded with sufficiently
energetic neutrons, which split the target nuclei typically into two nuclear fragments, which are
themselves nuclei of atoms of intermediate atomic weight, such as yttrium or xenon. Each fission
event releases energy in the form of kinetic energy and gamma radiation. A fissioning U233 atom also
releases an average of 2.5 neutrons, which permits a chain reaction to occur. In an uncontrolled
reaction, the number of fissions and resulting neutrons and energy releases increase exponentially in
time. If the time interval is small enough, an explosion occurs, as in an atomic bomb. If neutron
generation can be controlled to a steady state, where as many neutrons are used as are produced, the
released energy can be captured and used to generate electricity. See K. KRANE, INTRODUCTORY
NUCLEAR PHYSICS 478-527 (1988). One kilogram of fissioning uranium can release about the same
quantity of energy as an explosion of 20,000 tons of TNT. I. KAPLAN at 637. Theoretically, any
nucleus will fission if the bombarding neutrons are of high enough energy. U235 is ideal because
fission can be induced by slow (lower energy) neutrons. Id. at 608.
29 URANIUM ANN., supra note 16, at 3.
30 Uranium mills are usually located near the mines, and employ chemical leaching methods to
obtain a uranium oxide concentrate called yellowcake (U30s). Uranium quantities are usually ex-
pressed as U30 8 equivalent. Id.




Prior to the Second World War, uranium was mined incident to the
extraction of other elements and found use as an alloy constituent, and to
color glass and ceramics.32 Its first large-scale use was in atomic weap-
ons that were tested in the United States and subsequently dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing a swift close to World War II." The
Army Corps of Engineers was responsible for wartime weapons develop-
ment. 4 At that time, the only source of uranium was a single mine in
the Belgian Congo, as deposits in the United States remained
unexplored.
After the War, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
numbers of neutrons, the resultant size and weight differential can be exploited as a means of separa-
tion. The three U.S. enrichment plants employ the gaseous diffusion process. In this process, the
uranium oxide in yellowcake is first converted to gaseous uranium hexaflouride (UF6), which is then
passed several times through a cascaded molecular sieve. The UF6 featuring U 235 is slightly smaller
and lighter, and passes more readily through the sieve. See T. MOORE, URANIUM ENRICHMENT
AND PUBLIC POLICY 9-11, 14 (1978). Enrichment plant output is calculated by a complex formula
expressed in terms of Separative Work Units ("SWUs"). An SWU measures the amount of work
required to produce a certain weight of product at a certain composition, using feed material of a
certain weight and composition, with the process rejecting a weight of material ("tails") at a certain
composition. Brigoli, Cascade Theory, in URANIUM ENRICHMENT 39-42 (S. Villani ed. 1979).
A later developed process, known as gas centrifugation, physically spins the UF, and the ficti-
tious centrifugal force dispatches the UF6 containing the heavier Ung away from UF 6 containing the
lighter fissionable isotope. AM. NUCLEAR SoC., 2 NUCLEAR POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
FUEL/WASTE QUESTION & ANSWERS 4-6 (1982). A method still in development, called Atomic
Vapor Laser Isotope Separation ("AVLIS") relies on the fact that U 235 and U23s atoms absorb differ-
ent colors of light. A laser emitting wavelengths only absorbed by U235 ionizes these atoms, allowing
separation by an electromagnetic field. GOV'T ACC'T OFF., URANIUM ENRICHMENT, CONGRES-
SIONAL ACTION NEEDED TO REVITALIZE THE PROGRAM 26 (1987)[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
Uranium used to fuel the light water reactors typically operated in the United States, and the
subject of this Comment, requires further processing. The separated gaseous product containing
U25 is converted to solid uranium dioxide (UO 2) powder and compressed into cylindrical pellets,
then clad in sealed steel rods and arranged into fuel assemblies. URANIUM ANN., supra note 16, at 3.
See generally Proceedings of the Tri-Committee Business Advisory Panel on Uranium Enrichment:
Joint Meeting Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Production of the House Comm. on
Science and Technology, and the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, and the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Upon depletion, the spent fuel contain-
ing uranium, transuranic elements created by neutron capture, and the many fission products must
be stored indefinitely because of the intense and long-lived radioactivity of the waste. G. RUSS,
NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL: CLOSING THE CIRCLE (1984).
32 URANIUM ANN., supra note 16, at 2.
33 Marsh, The Nightmare is Born, Fin. Times, Dec. 3-4, 1988, at 1, col. 1; Greenwood, Ratjhens,
& Ruina, Nuclear Power and Weapons Proliferation, in G. TREVERTON, supra note 26, at 112.
34 The Manhattan Engineering District developed "the Bomb," constructing the first enrich-
ment facility at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. URANIUM ANN., supra note 16, at 2.
35 See Status of the Domestic Uranium Mining and Milling Industry: The Effects of Imports:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Development of the Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 405 (1981)[hereinafter 1981 Hearing]. See also Conant
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("AEA of 1946',).36 That enactment established the Atomic Energy
Commission ("AEC") to oversee further nuclear development. The
AEA of 1946 anticipated civilian use of nuclear energy for power genera-
tion but still prohibited private parties from owning enriched uranium.37
The AEC itself began to develop domestic as well as Canadian and South
African uranium sources in the succeeding years.38
The next major statutory revision, the AEA of 1954, maintained the
government's monopsony buyer status but encouraged the development
of peaceful uses for atomic energy.39 The United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union had built prototype reactors by 196 0.'o
B. Private Ownership and Enrichment Restrictions
1. Authorizing Legislation
By 1963, the desire to encourage development of atomic energy,
among other reasons, prompted the AEC to promote legislation allowing
private ownership of enriched uranium.4 ' One year later, Congress au-
thorized the private ownership and direct sale of "special nuclear materi-
als," as enriched uranium was then called,4 2 by amending the AEA in
1964 to include section 16 1(v). 43 The amendment dictated the conditions
under which the AEC could contract to enrich uranium for domestic
utilities as well as for foreign entities." In order to maintain sufficient
uranium supply potential for military purposes, Congress conditioned
& Kratzer International Dimensions of Energy, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 559, 597-98 (1978)[hereinafter
Conant].
36 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946)(codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter AEA of 1946].
37 Id. § 5(a), 60 Stat. 760-61. However, leasing uranium from the AEC was permitted. URA-
NIUM ANN., supra note 16, at 2.
38 The government had purchased over 100 million pounds of uranium from these countries by
the 1960s. T. NEFF, THE INTERNATIONAL URANIUM MARKET 145, 174-75 (1984).
39 AEA of 1954 § 52, 68 Stat. 929-30; Conant, supra note 35, at 584-85.
40 Kratzer, Nuclear Cooperation and Non-Proliferation, 17 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 250, 254-55
(1976).
41 See Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legisla-
tion of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963)[hereinafter 1963 Hearings].
42 The AEA of 1954 classified enriched uranium as "special nuclear material." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014(aa).
43 See note 3, supra.
44 The AEC was to issue written enrichment services "criteria" subject to prior review by the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [hereinafter JCAE]. Pricing had to be nondiscriminatory for all
customers and had to provide for recovery of the government's costs over a "reasonable period of
time." 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v). For a detailed history and analysis of the legal framework of uranium
enrichment, see Montange, The Federal Uranium Enrichment Program and the Criteria and Full




the ability of domestic uranium consumers to procure enrichment of for-
eign source uranium on the continued strength of the U.S. uranium min-
ing and milling industry:45 "[The AEC], to the extent necessary to
assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry, shall not
offer [enrichment] services for source or special nuclear materials of for-
eign origin intended for use in a utilization facility within or under the
jurisdiction of the United States."4 6 The statute required the AEC to
include in its enrichment criteria "the extent to which [enrichment] serv-
ices will be made available for [uranium] of foreign origin,"'47 based on its
survey of the uranium market.4" Congress' estimated that restrictions
would be required for only ten years, because by 1975, expected high
civilian demand alone would assure the viability of the domestic uranium
industry.4 9
While the authorization of trade-limiting enrichment restrictions
posed obvious problems with U.S. trade obligations, Congress paid only
lip service to the GATT system. The report of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy (JCAE) stated "these reasonable and flexible restrictions
on the performance of services by the [AEC] should not in any sense be
deemed inconsistent with any obligations the United States may have
under [GATT] and other international trade agreements," noting, how-
ever, that direct restrictions on the importation of foreign uranium would
not be "appropriate."50 The JCAE apparently considered, or at least
hoped, that enrichment would be thought of as a service and thus outside
45 See 1964 REPORT, supra note 17, at 3121. ("It is the committee's view that the measures
taken in this bill to assure the viability of the domestic uranium industry are in the national interest
since this industry is closely related to our vital defense and security interests.") It is not clear,
however, that only defense concerns, and not merely protectionism, were at work here. See Id. at
3135. ("In the committee's view the maintenance of a viable domestic industry is an integral part of
a sound nuclear industry and may, indeed, be closely intertwined with the defense and security
interests of the United States.") Id.
46 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v)(1982).
47 Id.
48 See 1964 REPORT, supra note 17, at 3120:
[S]uch importation could have a serious impact on the uranium mining and milling industry,
particularly during a period of limited demand for its product. Accordingly, the flexible restric-
tion contained in the committee bill will allow the [AEC] to review periodically the condition of
the domestic and world uranium markets and to offer enrichment services on a basis which will
assure, in its opinion, the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium mining and milling
industry.
Id.
49 1964 Hearings, supra note 4, at 5. The lifting of restrictions was not guaranteed: "While it is
possible that by 1975 substantial amounts of uranium could be freely imported into the United States
for enrichment and sale on the domestic market, one cannot at this time predict, with any degree of
certainty, the condition of the domestic uranium industry a decade hence." 1964 REPORT, supra
note 17, at 3135.
50 1964 REPORT, supra note 17, at 3121.
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the ambit of GATT." The AEC, however, ran the only enrichment fa-
cility outside of the Soviet Bloc, and thus future enrichment restrictions
would have the identical effect as direct import restrictions.5 2  The
United States Department of State ("State Department") was less san-
guine about the prospect of contravening trade obligations and issued a
letter to the AEC warning that future section 161(v) restrictions might
violate GATT and the general U.S. policy of reducing barriers to trade. 3
The matter, however, was left unresolved.
2. Establishment of Enrichment Criteria and Foreign Response
In 1966, the AEC established the first criteria for enrichment serv-
ices pursuant to Section 161(v). These criteria called for a complete mor-
atorium on the enrichment of foreign uranium for an indefinite period. 4
The embargo reflected, among other concerns, a desire to protect an "in-
fant industry," as little uranium had been sold to anyone outside the mili-
tary." The criteria also gave utilities the option of using a requirements
contract. 56 Under this arrangement, a utility could not obtain enrich-
ment services from any other source, but neither was it obligated to use a
minimum amount of enrichment. 7
Foreign uranium producers made no formal complaints under
51 "[I]t would be reasonable to place restrictions upon performance of services by the [AEC]
where the enrichment of foreign material would have an adverse effect on the domestic uranium
industry." Id. There is currently a movement to include trade in services as well as goods within the
purview of GATT. See infra note 190.
52 The AEC also attempted to reserve for itself the authority to regulate importation of enriched
uranium via its licensing authority over importation and possession in the event that domestic utili-
ties attempted to evade the statute by purchasing enriched uranium abroad. 1963 Hearings, supra
note 41, at 29-30 (testimony of Joseph Henness, Gen'l Counsel, AEC).
53 Letter from Alexis Johnson (Deputy Undersec'y, State Dept.) to Glenn Seaborg (Chairman,
AEC)(June 8, 1964), reprinted in 1964 Hearings, supra note 4, at 409-11 [hereinafter Johnson-Sea-
borg Letter]. See infra note 189 for further discussion.
54 Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, 31 Fed Reg. 16,479 (Dec. 23, 1966) [hereinafter 1966
Criteria].
55 See, e.g., Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria and Related Matters: Hearings Before the
Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 168-69 (1966)[hereinafter 1966 Hear-
ings](statement of Dean McGee, Kerr-McGee)(restrictions needed only until domestic industry can
establish itself in the commercial market). Protection of an infant industry is justified on the theory
that a competitive industry will ultimately emerge if it is protected from competition in the early
stages of its development. Gains may not ultimately be realized, however, if the new industry re-
mains inefficient instead of cutting its comparative cost disadvantage. This protection of high cost
output also penalizes downstream industries. See H. GRAY, FREE TRADE OR PROTECTIONISM 136-
37 (1985).
56 1966 Criteria, supra note 54; 1966 Hearings, supra note 55, at 4-5, 7-8 (statement of Glenn
Seaborg, Chairman, AEC).
57 Id.; see Yokell & De Salvo, The Uranium Default: Westinghouse and the Utilities, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Feb. 7, 1985, at 22 [hereinafter Yokell & De Salvo].
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GATT, but they did criticize the embargo as an unfair departure from
free trade goals and GATT norms.5 8 Consumers of foreign uranium
benefitted, however, because they did not have to compete with purchas-
ers in the United States for supplies available abroad.5 9
C. Market Distortions
L Upward Distortions
In the early part of the 1970s, the oil embargo, an increased pro-
jected demand for electricity, enhanced confidence in nuclear power as a
reliable energy source, and growing environmental concern over the use
of nonrenewable fossil fuels combined to prompt the AEC to make opti-
mistic projections for growth in nuclear generating capacity. 0 Since the
AEC needed approximately eight years lead time to get new enrichment
plants on line, it proposed a new long-term fixed commitment contract
that would guarantee business for its planned enrichment capacity.61
The contract required utilities to commit to purchase enrichment serv-
ices, measured in units called Separative Work Units (SWtUs), eight years
in advance of enrichment of a reactor's initial core, and to specify exact
SWUs needed on a continuous ten-year forward basis.62
To assure that their expensive new nuclear plants would not sit idle,
purchasers of enrichment services hedged against the possibility of facing
a fuel supply shortfall in the future by locking in enrichment of fuel for
their maximum projected requirements. This demand for enrichment
quickly committed the AEC's enrichment capacity, forcing it to close its
58 See Diplomatic Note No. 359 from the Embassy 6f Canada (Dec. 3, 1971) reprinted in Brief of
the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at appendix b, Huffman v.
Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663 (1988)[hereinafter Canada Brief]("The Canadian Government
has also pointed out that the restriction conflicts with United States' obligations and Canadian rights
under the GATT, and has requested that the United States Government undertake to remove the
restriction by a specified early date."); Aide Memoire to U.S. Gov't from Gov't of Australia (Dec. 13,
197 1), reprinted in Brief of the Government of Australia as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at appendix 3, Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663 (1988)[hereinafter Australia
Brief]("The Australian Government would welcome the early announcement of a definite date for
the relaxation of the import embargo on foreign uranium to assist the normalization of world trade
in this commodity.").
59 Conant, supra note 35, at 599; T. MOORE, URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 39
(1978).
60 Total worldwide nuclear generating capacity was projected to increase 80-fold by the turn of
the century. Montange, supra note 44, at 21-22.
61 Proposed Changes in AEC Contract Arrangements for Uranium Enriching Services: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 267
(1973)[hereinafter 1973 Hearings].
62 Id. at 23-26, 292-94. See also supra note 31.
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order books.63 This hedging behavior also created an enormous but illu-
sory demand for uranium. The utilities, in contracting for enrichment
services they might not ultimately need, also had to arrange for uranium
feed material to be delivered to the AEC enrichment plants in quantities
reflecting the amount of future SWUs purchased. Utilities thus also be-
came committed to purchase uranium probably far in excess of what
their actual needs would be. Prices skyrocketed, inducing the producers
to step up production.6 The contract cut-off and the enrichment em-
bargo also spurred development of competitive enrichment capability
abroad.65
63 Taylor, How the U.S. Government Created the Uranium Crisis (and the Coming Uranium
Bust) (1977), reprinted in Uranium Enrichment Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy
Research and Development of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 143 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearing].
64 It was also revealed that uranium producers were involved in a price-fixing cartel with foreign
producers, which may also have maintained upward pressure on prices. In re Uranium Antitrust
Litig., 473 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ill. 1979). See also E. GRAY, THE GREAT URANIUM CARTEL (1982);
J. TAYLOR & M. YOKELL, YELLOWCAKE, THE INTERNATIONAL URANIUM CARTEL (1979). In an
effort to convince prospective utility customers to purchase its nuclear reactors, Westinghouse en-
tered into long-term, fixed-price uranium supply contracts with the utilities when uranium prices
were steady at about $6.00 per pound. The rise in price to $40.00 per pound by 1975 forced West-
inghouse to default on the contracts in the face of staggering potential losses. Maher, Antitrust Fall-
Out: Tensions in Australian-American Relationship, 13 FED. L. REV. 105-07 (1982). It defended the
resulting multiple lawsuits on the theory that unexpected high prices and scarcity created by an
international producers' cartel frustrated performance. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Ura-
nium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981). In turn, Westinghouse sued the producers,
alleging that foreign producers had conspired to fix prices and had induced domestic producers to go
along. See Rankin, The Supreme Court of Canada and the International Uranium Cartel: Gulf Oil
and Canadian Sovereignty, 2 Sup. CT. L. REV. 411-13 (1981).
Representatives of Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, and South Africa actually
did meet in Paris in February of 1972 to discuss how to react to the continuing U.S. enrichment
embargo, which had foreclosed them from the largest uranium market. Believing that their GATT
rights were violated by the embargo, these governments, and uranium producers from these nations,
agreed to eliminate competition for sales outside the five participants and the United States. Id.
65 In addition to the DOE, there now are three international competitors in the enrichment field.
Eurodif is a consortium of French, Spanish, Belgian, and Italian interests which enjoys a 32% mar-
ket share. It operates with a capacity of 10.8 million SWU per year, employing the gaseous diffusion
process. German, British, and Dutch private and government partners comprise Urenco, which has
capacity of approximately two million SWU per year. Its three gas centrifuge facilities account for
7% of the world market. The Soviet Union's Techsnabexport provides enrichment services to the
Soviet-Bloc countries, as well as offering three million SWU per year to Western customers. GAO
REPORT, supra note 31, at 21-22. By comparison, DOE's total enrichment capacity is 27 million
SWUs. Id. at 8. Urenco plans to build a gas centrifugation plant in the United States if it can
resolve DOE's security and energy concerns. DOE Says Urenco Plant in U.S. Raises Security, En-
ergy Policy Issues, NUCLEARFUEL, Feb. 20, 1989, at 3. Japan, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina
are also developing enrichment technology, although Japan is likely to be the only serious competi-
tor, with a projected three million SWU per year capacity by 2004. Japan is a leader in the develop-




In 1974, Congress held hearings to study the possibility of eliminat-
ing the enrichment embargo.66 With uranium demand so high, and the
domestic mining industry producing at capacity, the AEC announced
later that year that enrichment restrictions could be eased and dictated a
phased elimination over the period from 1977 to 1984.67
2. What Goes Up ....
The bubble soon burst, however, as a different constellation of
events caused the uranium price structure to collapse. Energy conserva-
tion efforts increased in reaction to the oil embargo, thereby reducing
demand for electricity, and consequently for nuclear reactors and fuel.68
Utilities obligated to purchase possibly unneeded enrichment services by
the long-term, fixed-commitment contracts asked for contract adjust-
ments. In 1978, the Department of Energy ("DOE"), which had taken
over responsibility for the enrichment program from the now defunct
AEC,69 complied by creating an adjustable fixed commitment contract
featuring shorter lead and commitment periods.70 Utilities were thus
able to order enrichment services conforming more to their actual ura-
nium fuel needs, which reduced the demand for uranium.
Further, the domestic nuclear utility industry itself began to experi-
ence significant problems. A near disaster at the Three Mile Island plant
in Pennsylvania, 1 the realization that the nuclear waste problem might
be intractable,72 and construction cost overruns and delays caused by the
66 Proposed Modification of Restrictions on Enrichment of Foreign Uranium for Domestic Use.
Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
67 See Modification of Restrictions, supra note 20. The criteria allowed foreign uranium enrich-
ment in the following percentages: 1977, 10%; 1978, 15%; 1979, 20%; 1980, 30%; 1981, 40%; 1982,
60%; 1983, 80%; 1984, 100%. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, SUMMARY OF TRADE AND TARIFF
INFORMATION: URANIUM AND URANIUM COMPOUNDS 28 (1984).
68 Montange, supra note 44, at 26.
69 The AEC was abolished by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438,
§ 104, 88 Stat. 1233, 1237 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5814 (1982)). Its enrichment responsibility was
briefly transferred to the new Energy Research and Development Administration ("ERDA") in the
energy conscious 1970s. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5812, 5814(c)(1982). Congress later abolished ERDA, trans-
ferring its functions to the DOE. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91
Stat. 565, (1977)(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982)) [hereinafter DOE Organization
Act].
70 The commitment period was halved to five years, and the lead for execution was cut from
eight to six years. 1978 Hearings, supra note 63, at 244-45.
71 It has since been revealed that fully half the reactor core melted. New View About Three Mile
Island, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1988, at 23, col. 1 (city ed.). Molten U0 2 fuel broke through the inner
containment vessel, leaving engineers puzzled as to why the outer, and final, containment vessel was
not breached. Sullivan, Three Mile Island Reveals New Details, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1988, at 17, col.
3 (nat'l ed.).
72 The nuclear industry maintains that nuclear wastes can be disposed of safely. "More than 25
years of scientific investigation, laboratory analysis, and field experiment.., conclude that separat-
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need to upgrade engineering" contributed to decisions by the utilities to
cancel reactor orders and abandon works-in-progress.74 The resulting
overstock in enriched and natural uranium gave rise to an active secon-
dary market, as utilities attempted to diminish the size of their fule stock-
piles,75 depressing uranium demand further. The overheated market of
the 1970s had given way to idle mines by the early 1980s.
D. New Requests for Protection, Another Contract, and Nonviability
In 1981, just four years after the enrichment restrictions began to be
phased out, representatives of the domestic mining industry demanded
relief under section 161(v).76 Canada and Australia warned that rein-
statement of restrictions would lead to action under GATT.77
Although the DOE did not reimpose restrictions, Congress did alter
the AEA to improve the DOE's accountability regarding its monitoring
of the viability of the mining industry by adding section 170B in 1983.78
This required the DOE to report annually 79 and establish criteria for as-
sessing viability. 0 In its 1983 report to Congress, the DOE found that
ing nuclear waste from man's environment can take place safely by burial in mined geologic forma-
tions." G. Russ, supra note 31, at 9. But see Schneider, U.S. Delays Start of Plant To Store Nuclear
Wastes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1988, at 1, col. 3 (nat'l ed.)(nation's first repository designed to store
waste from 45 years of nuclear weapons production, remaining radioactive for 280,000 years,
delayed because of safety concerns and leaks). There are also concerns over the DOE's competence
to manage waste site construction and operation. Wald, Work Is Faltering on U.S. Repository for
Atomic Waste, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1989, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.). The effect on containment vessels
and sites of long-term exposure to intense radiation is, of course, not yet known.
73 Only 24 of 112 licensed reactors have completed the numerous changes required by the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission following the Three Mile Island accident. Nuclear Safety Goals are
Not Met, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1989, at 39, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
74 Over 100 plants ordered since 1973 have been cancelled, and there have been no new orders
since 1978. Nuclear power remains an important source of electricity, however, rising from 11.4%
to 20.0% of generated power from 1979 to 1989. See Industry is Doing Better but Prospects Are
Grim, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at 38, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). At the time of the Three Mile Island
incident, there were 25 plants on order, 95 under construction, and 72 in operation. In 1989, there
are only two on order, twelve under construction, and 111 in operation. Wald, 10 years After Three
Mile Island, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at 25, col. 3 (nat'l ed.).
75 Proposed Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, 51 Fed. Reg. 3624, 3625 (1986)(to be codi-
fied at 10 C.F.R. pt. 762)(proposed Jan. 24, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Proposed Criteria].
76 1981 Hearing, supra note 35.
77 Id. at 27-28 (statement of Harry R. Marshall, State Dept.); letter from Ambassador Nicholas
Parkinson (Australia) to Sen. Pete Domenici, reprinted in 1981 Hearing, supra note 35, at 36-39.
78 Act of Jan. 4, 1983, Pub. L. 97-415, § 170B, 96 Stat. 2067, 2081-83 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210b (Supp. V 1987)).
79 "The [DOE] shall monitor and for the years 1983 to 1992 report annually to the Congress and
to the President a determination of the viability of the domestic uranium mining and milling indus-
try . I. " d. at § 2210b(a).
80 The criteria vaguely defined viability in terms of the capability at a particular time of supply-
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the domestic industry was viable,81 eliminating for the moment any re-
course the uranium industry had in section 161(v).
In an effort to lure enrichment business away from less expensive
foreign enrichment concerns, the DOE adopted still another contract for-
mulation in 1984. This new contract allowed for reduction, and later
elimination, of fixed commitments, provided a price ceiling, and required
acceptance of only 70% of the services contracted for by its customers.82
The contract also provided for a "variable tails assay" option. This
meant that a utility, in obtaining a given quantity of fuel, could elect
between two enrichment options. If it desired to supply a greater amount
of uranium feed material to the plant, less enrichment would be required
to obtain the desired fuel quantity. If a utility instead wished to supply a
smaller quantity of uranium feed, more enrichment would be required to
derive the same amount of fuel. In the former case, assay of U235 remain-
ing in the "tails" (the material depleted in U 235 remaining after enrich-
ment) would be higher in U235 than in the latter, hence the name variable
tails assay.83 These new policies and options would yield a more realistic
demand for uranium.
The DOE found the-uranium industry was nonviable between 1984
and 1986.84 In 1986, it initiated a rulemaking to consider revising the
enrichment criteria.85 The DOE proposed no restrictions on enrichment
because it believed that restrictions would not assure viability. It blamed
the bad straits of the industry on high domestic production costs and the
general collapse of demand rather than import competition.8 6 The crite-
ria adopted featured no restrictions.87 The DOE also indicated that re-
strictions on enrichment would be pointless because of the availability of
enrichment services abroad. 88
ing domestic needs under hypothetical situations. Criteria to Assess Viability of Domestic Mining
and Milling Industry, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,746 (1983)(codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 761 (1988)).
81 S. REP. No. 214, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1987).
82 Montange, supra note 44, at 29.
83 See Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, 825 F.2d 1430, 1433 (10th Cir. 1987). Fruit juice is
analogous. One can squeeze two oranges a little to obtain the same amount of juice as from a single
firmly squeezed orange. The juice remaining in each of the two lightly squeezed oranges would be
greater than in the firmly squeezed one. Each of the former would have a higher "juice assay" than
the latter.
84 S. REP. No. 214, supra note 81, at 9.
85 1986 Proposed Criteria, supra note 75.
86 Id. at 3627.
87 Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,132 (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 762)
[hereinafter 1986 Criteria].
88 Id. at 27,138.
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E. The Producers Resort to the Courts: Iuffman v. Western Nuclear
1. The Litigation
Even before the DOE made the nonviability findings, three uranium
mining and milling companies sued the DOE in federal court in Colo-
rado in 1984. The suit challenged the 1984 contract and claimed that the
DOE had violated section 161(v) by not imposing enrichment restric-
tions.8 9 The trial judge voided the contract because the DOE had failed
to follow procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act and the
AEA, 90 and enjoined the DOE from enriching any foreign uranium for
domestic use.91
The Tenth Circuit remanded the contract question for findings re-
garding the nexus between the adoption of the contract and the reduced
demand facing the domestic industry. 92 The court affirmed the restric-
tions on foreign uranium enrichment but limited its analysis to statutory
construction.93 The Supreme Court reversed, principally on the ration-
89 Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, No. 84-C-2315 (D. Colo. June 20, 1986), aff'd, 825 F.2d
1430 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 486 U.S. 663 (1988). Western Nuclear, Inc., Energy
Fuels Nuclear, Inc. and Uranium Resources, Inc. sued the DOE, then-Energy Secretary Donald C.
Hodel, and several DOE officers involved in the enrichment program, including F. Clark Huffman,
Chief of the Enrichment Services Branch.
90 Both the AEA, 42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1982) and the DOE Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7191(a)(1)(1982), require DOE compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988). Specifically, rulemaking for contracts criteria is subject to notice and
comment requirements persuant to the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 and the DOE Organization Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7191(b). The 1964 statute also provides that "[t]he [DOE] shall establish criteria in writing
setting forth the terms and conditions under which services provided under this subsection shall be
made available .... Provided, that before the [DOE] establishes such criteria, the proposed criteria
shall be submitted to the [JCAE]." 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v). The successors to the JCAE are the Senate
Energy and Natural Resources Committee, and the House Committees on Energy and Commerce,
and on Interior and Insular Affairs. See Montange, supra note 44.
91 District Judge Jim R. Carrigan's order granting summary judgment for the uranium company
plaintiffs required that, commencing January 1, 1987, the DOE could not provide any enrichment
services for foreign-origin uranium intended for domestic end use, at least until the "viability of the
domestic uranium industry [was] assured." Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, No. 84-C-2315 (D.
Colo. June 20, 1986)(order granting summary judgment). The court also ordered rulemaking to
establish criteria for providing enrichment services to comply with § 161(v) so that a viable domestic
industry could be maintained, including the extent to which services could be made available to
enrich foreign-source uranium. Id.
92 Western Nuclear, 825 F.2d at 1434-37. A finding of injury to the domestic industry caused by
a preference for foreign uranium built into the new contract might also have affected the restrictions
determination.
93 The court found that the phrase "to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable
domestic uranium industry, [the DOE] shall not offer [enrichment services]," only controlled the
calculus of the amount of restrictions, not whether to impose restrictions at all. Western Nuclear,
825 F.2d at 1438-39 (emphasis in original). The court distinguished Young v. Community Nutrition
Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986), in which the Supreme Court interpreted a statute which guided the extent
to which the presence of a poisonous food additive should be regulated by the Food and Drug
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ale that the courts below had rested their holdings on the erroneous as-
sumption that restrictions would always assure the viability of the
uranium industry.94 The plaintiffs maintained that Congress had made
such a policy determination and that the DOE merely disagreed with
Congress. The DOE, on the other hand, contended that if no extent of
restriction could achieve the statutory goal of viability, then it was not a
violation not to impose restrictions, and in fact might be outside of its
statutory authority to do so in such circumstances. 95 The Court agreed
with the DOE, at least for the limited purpose of ruling on summary
judgment, refusing to adopt the Procrustean logic of the lower courts.9 6
The Court would not force the DOE to create protectionist measures
that would not further the statutory goal, particularly when there was a
complete lack of guidance as to amount of restrictions necessary. The
Court remanded for a determination of whether the DOE nevertheless
violated section 161(v) by improperly determining that no amount of re-
strictions would assure viability.97
2. Reaction to the Litigation
The international trade implications of the Western Nuclear case
were not lost upon the Office of the United States Trade Representatives
("USTR") nor upon the governments of Canada and Australia. The
USTR opposed the district court injunction, claiming that damage to
Administration ("FDA"). The statute in Young provided that "the [FDA] shall promulgate regula-
tions limiting the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of
public health .. " 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1982)(emphasis added). The FDA had maintained that the
phrase "to such extent" modified the word "shall," thus giving it discretion to decide if any regula-
tion at all was necessary. The Young court found that the phrase could also be read to modify "the
quantity therein or thereon." Since the phrase was therefore ambiguous, the reasonable agency in-
terpretation was entitled to deference (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Young, 476 U.S. at 980-81. The Western Nuclear court found
that the word "shall" in § 161(v) could only mean that restrictions were required and that the modi-
fying phrase "to the extent" unambiguously informed the DOE of the amount of restrictions re-
quired. Western Nuclear, 825 F.2d at 1438-39. The court further distinguished Young because
other methods were available to the FDA to protect public health, while the DOE's only means of
maintaining the viability of the uranium industry was through enrichment restrictions. Id. at 1439.
94 Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663, -, 108 S. Ct. 2087, 2093 (1988).
95 Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2092.
96 Id. The Court, however, scolded the DOE in a footnote for not articulating any construction
of § 161 (v) prior to the litigation. The Court agreed that the statute was unambiguous and thus it
declined to consider how much deference to give the DOE. In light of the manner in which the
DOE came upon its interpretation, it would not likely have been very much. Id. n.9 (citing Securi-
ties Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1984)(post hoc rationalizations for
agency actions entitled to little deference)). Cf Diver, Statutory Interpretations in the Administrative
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 593 (1985)("courts should presumptively defer to an agency's inter-
pretation of a statute under which the agency exercises significant policyrnaking responsibility").
97 Western Nuclear, 486 U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2092-93.
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trade relations would result and that the restriction "would be subject to
legal challenge under [GATT]." 98 Australia noted that the restriction
would:
disrupt the world market for uranium, erode international confidence in the
reliability and predictability of the United States policies affecting interna-
tional co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and give rise to a
major problem in trade relations between our countries in that it will im-
pact adversely and unfairly on Australia's exports of uranium to the U.S. 99
Following the appellate decision, Australia also charged that the re-
striction would contravene declarations against protectionism made by
the United States at the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations.1" Canada
reiterated Australia's concerns,1 ' emphasizing that the FTA then being
negotiated would be imperiled by the decision.l0 2
The mining companies dropped the remanded suit in 1989 in order
to devote their resources to legislative efforts. With Canadian uranium
treated as domestic under the FTA, they would have had difficulty prov-
ing that restricting enrichment of the small remainder of non-Canadian
uranium being imported into the United States would restore viability. 103
With at least the provisional blessing of the Supreme Court, the
DOE refused to implement new section 161(v) restrictions. 1° The subse-
98 Declaration of Robert Reinstein, Dir. of Energy Trade Policy, United States Trade Represen-
tative [hereinafter USTR], June 13, 1986, reprinted in Brief of Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., Amok Ltd.,
Saskatchewan Mining Dev. Corp., Uranerz Exploration & Mining Ltd., and the Gov'ts of the Prov-
inces of Saskatchewan and Ontario as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at appendix B,
Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663 (1988)[hereinafter Canadian Interests Brief].
The fact that restrictions would have had far-ranging effects is reflected in the number of amici
taking part in the litigation. In the Tenth Circuit, twenty-five nuclear utilities, the National Taxpay-
ers Union, and the attorneys general of five uranium-producing states filed. Amici at the Supreme
Court on the merits included the federal governments of Australia and Canada, Canadian provincial
governments and uranium producers, as well as Senators Bingaman, Domenici, Garn, Hatch, Simp-
son and Wallop.
99 Diplomatic Note No. 186/86A (June 27, 1986), reprinted in Australia Brief, supra note 58, at
appendix 1.
100 Diplomatic Note No. 237/87 (July 24, 1987), reprinted in Australia Brief, supra note 58, at
appendix 2. See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (Sept. 20, 1986), in CONTRACTING
PARTIES TO GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter BISD] 19 (33d
Supp. 1987).
101 Diplomatic Note No. 194 (July 22, 1987) reprinted in Canada Brief, supra note 58, at appen-
dix A. See also Appeals Court Bars Energy Department from Enriching any Foreign Uranium, 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 962-63 (July 29, 1987).
102 See notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
103 U.S. Miners Formally Drop DOE Lawsuit, Draft Enrichment Bill Expected in House,
NUCLEARFUEL, Feb. 6, 1989, at 2.
104 The DOE did not achieve a true victory because there was the possibility that further proceed-
ings could have revealed a nexus between restrictions and viability. See Supreme Court Rules De-
partment of Energy Need not Limit Foreign Uranium Enrichment, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 917
(Jun. 22, 1988). The DOE was nonetheless relieved because it had $300 million per year in enrich-
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quent enactment of the FTA effectively repealed it with respect to the
United States' largest trading partner. The FTA also narrowed the abil-
ity of each nation to rely on national security as a pretext for protecting
domestic energy industries.
F. The Gutting of Section 161(v): Free Trade with Canada
L Mechanics of the Agreement
Not only has section 161(v) not been enforced, it no longer applies
to the largest foreign supplier of uranium to the United States. The
FTA105 exempts Canada from "any restriction on the enrichment of for-
eign uranium under Section 161(v)." 10 6
The FTA generally incorporates the GATT obligation to accord na-
tional treatment to goods 0 7 and attempts to set up a Free Trade Area
under Article XXIV. 10 The Agreement also provides strong measures
ment fees at stake and a substantial prior debt to retire. See Uranium Industry Loses in High Court
on Imports, N.Y. Times, Jun. 16, 1988, at 28, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
105 Following two years of negotiations, President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney signed
the agreement in 1988 to eliminate all barriers to trade between the two countries by the turn of the
century. Farnsworth, Economic Spur Set by US. and Canada in New Trade Pact, N.Y. Times, Oct.
5, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.); Farnsworth, Reagan and Mulroney Sign Pact to Cut US. -Canada
Trade Curbs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). Congress quickly approved the pact,
but it became the dominant issue in the Canadian general election. Russell, Those Irish Eyes Are
Smiling Again: After an Emotional Campaign, Mulroney-And Free Trade with the U.S.-Wins a
Resounding Victory, TIME, Dec. 5, 1988, at 39. The Canadians had felt that their identity and
prosperity would be subsumed into those of the United States. See Freeman, Mulroney's Victory in
Canada Bodes Well for its Ties with U.S., Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1988, at 1, col. 6, (midwest
ed.)(Canadian opposition to the FTA based on their belief that they are "more charitable, more
peacable and more tolerant. It's hardly hairy-chested nationalism".)
The Canadians approved the pact, and it became effective January I, 1989. United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449 § 101, 102 Stat.
1851, 1852 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988)) [hereinafter FTA Act]; see also Farnsworth, Wide
Effect Seen From Trade Pact, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1989 at 21, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
106 FTA, supra note 22, annex 902.5. Implementing legislation amends § 161(v) so that the
phrase "foreign origin" excludes "source or special nuclear material originating in Canada." FTA
Act, supra note 105, § 305(b), 102 Stat. 1876, 19 U.S.C. § 2112. Canada also agreed to exempt the
United States from its policy, adopted in 1985, requiring uranium to be upgraded to the fullest extent
possible (to UF6) within Canada before export. Canadian Officials Analyze Impact of FTA on Ura-
nium Trade with U.S., NUCLEARFUEL, Feb. 8, 1988, at 2. The United States had challenged this
policy under GATT. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
107 FTA, supra note 22, arts. 105, 501, 502; GATT, supra note 7, art. III.
108 "[A] free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in
which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce ... are eliminated on substantially all
the trade between the constituent territories on products originating in such territory." GATT,
supra note 7, at art. XXIV(8)(b). This arrangement denies most-favored-nation treatment to prod-
ucts of outside countries in violation of GAIT articles I and II. Free Trade Areas are permitted,
however, if four criteria are met: the purpose is to facilitate trade among the parties, and not to raise
barriers to trade with other GATT members; it applies to "substantially all" trade to avoid discrimi-
natory effects; the resulting external barriers are not higher than before; and the parties follow article
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to assure that energy trade will remain free,'1 9 and it places energy trade
explicitly under the aegis of GATT.1"' Specifically, the parties affirmed
their "rights and obligations under [GATT] with respect to prohibitions
or restrictions on bilateral trade in energy goods."'' "Energy goods"
refers to goods classified in the Harmonized Tariff System and includes
most forms of uranium.' 12
The FTA also contains a narrower general exception for national
security than does GATT."3 The United States and Canada agreed not
to cloak measures restricting energy trade under these exceptions. They
can now invoke either exception only to the extent necessary to maintain
XXIV procedures for notice and consultation with Contracting Parties, and for negotiation with
affected states. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 809 comment b (1987)[hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW].
The experience of the United States-Israel Free Trade Area shows blessing by GATT can take
some time. See Free Trade Area Agreement Between Israel and the United States, Report of the
Working Party adopted 14 May 1987 (L/6140), in BISD, supra note 100, at 58 (34th Supp. 1988);
see also GATT ACTIVITIES 1987, supra note 14, at 83 (concerns by Working Party that agreement
broke new ground as it was between countries with no historical trade ties nor geographical proxim-
ity, over conformity to GATT, and effect on third parties). If a Free Trade Area did not technically
qualify for exception under article XXIV, waivers can be granted for associations of states into
regional associations. J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 545-46. The Contracting Parties, by a two-thirds
vote, can waive an obligation imposed by GATT "[iln exceptional circumstances not elsewhere pro-
vided for in [GATT]..." GATT, supra note 7, Art. XXV(5). Since the FTA strongly reaffirms and
parallels GATT, it is unlikely that this will be necessary.
109 FTA, supra note 22, ch. 9. See Office of the USTR, Summary of the Agreement (rev. ed. Oct.
8, 1987)(unpublished release)("[flree and open energy trade is an essential component of the FTA
because it enhances the energy security and increases the industrial competitiveness of both coun-
tries. There is a broad agreement to assure the freest possible bilateral trade in energy.").
110 "[FTA] Articles 902, 903, and 904 are border measures that build on the [GATT] .... The
GATT is already applied to energy trade, [it has] for the last 40 years. It's not new. It may be new
that we are suddenly paying attention to GATT in the energy area." U.S. Energy Official Sees Boost
in Gas Trade Resulting From U.S.-Canada Trade Agreement, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 898, 899
(June 15, 1988)(quoting Robert Reinstein, USTR)[hereinafter Reinstein Statement]. The DOE's po-
sition on the FTA was that it merely maintained the status quo of "freer" uranium trade. Energy:
Free Trade with Canada: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 165-66 (1988)[hereinafter FTA Energy Hear-
ings](Statement of William Martin, Deputy Secretary, DOE).
111 FTA, supra note 22, art. 902(1).
112 Id., art. 901(2). These include uranium ores and concentrates, elemental uranium and its
compounds and mixtures, uranium and its compounds enriched and depleted in U235, and spent fuel
elements. USITC, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHED. OF THE UNITED STATES subheads. 2612.10,
2844.10-2844.50 (effective Jan. 1, 1989)(USITC Pub. 2030). The FTA also invokes GATT to pro-
hibit price floors on uranium exports or imports except where minimum import price requirements
are permitted in enforcing countervailing duty and antidumping orders and undertakings. FTA,
supra note 22, art. 902.2.
113 A GATT Contracting Party can take action to protect its "essential security interests," in-
cluding measures related to "fissionable materials." GATT, supra note 7, art. XXI. See infra notes
203-208 and accompanying text. The parallel FTA provision omits the fissionable materials excep-
tion and adds a consideration regarding non-proliferation. FTA, supra note 22, art. 2003.
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military supply and fulfill defense contracts, respond to armed conflicts,
implement non-proliferation policies, or respond to threats of disruption
of nuclear materials supply for defense purposes.1 14 The FTA exception
does not mention or allude to civilian uranium supply situations." 5
The FTA further restricts the use of general exceptions contained in
GATT articles XI and XX. Article XI prohibits the use of quotas or'
licenses to restrict imports or exports,116 but allows temporary exceptions
for export restrictions to relieve shortages of "products essential to the
exporting Contracting Party."' 17 Article XX contains exceptions al-
lowing measures to conserve "exhaustible natural resources,"' 18 to limit
exports to "ensure essential quantities of... materials to a processing
industry" under certain conditions," 9 and to acquire or distribute prod-
ucts in short supply.'2° The FTA permits application of these restric-
tions to energy goods trade only if it will not reduce total proportional
exports of the good, the United States and Canada do not charge a higher
export price than domestic, and supply channels are not disrupted.
121
The FTA mirrors GATT article XXIII112 2 in providing avenues for
dispute resolution when measures, whether or not in conflict with the
FTA, cause "nullification and impairment of any benefit reasonably ex-
pected to accrue" to a party. 123 In addition, if a party perceives that an
"energy regulatory action" would result in "discrimination against its
energy goods,"' 12 4 it can initiate consultations with the other party.
125
The United States and Canada must also consult to avoid market distor-
tions if either party restricts imports of energy goods from third
countries. 1
26
114 FTA, supra note 22, art. 907.
115 The USTR negotiator for the energy section of the FTA stated that article 907 narrows the
circumstances by which Canada or the United States can cite national security to justify limiting
energy trade to critical defense needs, or to carrying out nuclear non-proliferation programs. Rein-
stein Statement, supra note 110.
116 GATT, supra note 7, art. XI(1). See infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
117 GATT, supra note 7, art. XI(2)(a).
118 Id. art. XX(g).
119 Id. art. XX(i).
120 Id. art. XX(j).
121 FIA, supra note 22, art. 904.
122 GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII. See infra note 175.
123 FTA, supra note 22, art. 2011. Procedures include consultations (art. 1804), and dispute
settlement procedures (arts. 1805, 1807), or consent arbitration (art. 1806).
124 FTA, supra note 22, art. 905.
125 Id.
126 Id. art. 902(4).
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2. Miners' Response
The uranium producers felt singled out for unfair treatment under
the FTA,127 and urged its rejection.' 28 Industry attempts to modify the
FTA were limited by the fast-track process governing ratification of exec-
utive negotiated trade agreements. 2 9 The complaints centered around
claims that the Canadian government subsidized exploration, produc-
tion, and upgrading of uranium, 130 and tolerated dumping into the U.S.
market.131 The USTR's office weakly countered that negotiations would
proceed in the next five to seven years to achieve better "discipline" in
this area, and that remedies under existing countervailing duty law might
still be utilized. 132 The USTR also pointed out that the uranium industry
still qualified for "escape clause" protection under section 201 of the
Trade Act of 1974.133 One Senator complained that the FTA "wiped
127 US. Non-Ferrous Metals Producers, Uranium Producers, Oppose Free Trade Agreement, 5
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 73-74 (Jan. 20, 1988).
128 Proposed U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement on Domestic Mining and Natural Resources"
Oversight Hearing before the Subcomm. on Mining and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs,, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, 59 (1988)(statement of John Adams, Board
Chairman, Energy Fuels Corp.)[hereinafter FTA Oversight Hearing]("I appear before you today to
urge that the FTA with Canada be rejected .... [Uranium] was one of those giveaways by the U.S.
negotiators.") Senator Simpson agreed, but was also pragmatic, stating that because Wyoming's
uranium industry was already dormant, ratification of the FTA would be like "shooting a corpse."
Time Running Short on Trade Agreement; US Approval Needed Before October, NUCLEARFUEL,
Jan. 25, 1988, at 8.
129 Official Says Uranium Industry Plan to Amend U.S.-Canada Accord Will Fail, Daily Rep. for
Execs. (BNA)(Jan. 29, 1988). This limitation provides the executive real negotiating authority with
trade partners. Office of the USTR, Background on Free Trade Areas (Oct. 4, 1987)(press release).
130 See FTA Oversight Hearing, supra note 128 at 246-47, 249-51 (statement of John Adams,
Energy Fuels Corp.).
131 One senator complained that delivery prices for Canadian utilities varied between $50 and $80
per pound, but were dumped at below production cost at $15 to $20 per pound in the United States.
FTA Energy Hearings, supra note 110, at 208 (statement of Sen. Nielson).
132 See Letter from Ambassador Clayton Yeutter (USTR) to Sen. Alan Simpson (April 19,
1988)[hereinafter Yeutter-Simpson Letter], reprinted in Implementation of the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement and the Potential Impacts on Energy and Natural Resource Industries: Hear-
ings before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 120-21
(1988)[hereinafter FTA Implementation Hearings]. See GATT, Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done
Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, (Subsidies Code). Countervailing duty law for U.S.
imports from GATT signatory countries is governed by 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671(h) (1988). Dump-
ing is proscribed by the GATT Anti-Dumping Code, which implements article VI. Agreement on
the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12,
1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650. See 19 U.S.C. 1673-77(k) (1988). See also infra notes 171-
73 and accompanying text.
133 ETA Implementation Hearings, supra note 132, at 13 (statement of Clayton Yeutter, Ambas-
sador, USTR); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-613, §§ 201-03, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011-2018 (1975)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-54 (1988)). This clause provides that under certain cir-
cumstances, the International Trade Commission ("ITC") will investigate whether an increase in
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out" section 161(v).' 34
3. Implications
Prior section 161(v) restrictions created a two-tiered uranium price
structure, with artificially inflated prices in the United States, and an
oversupply elsewhere that depressed prices. These and other market dis-
tortions ultimately turned out to be disastrous for the domestic uranium
industry. However, because Canadian uranium is treated as domestic
under the FTA, this two-tiered pricing system is largely avoided, even in
the unlikely event section 161(v) restrictions are reinstated.
135
It is unclear to what extent the FTA will affect the uranium market
because it largely preserves the status quo.136 Even so, it is clear that the
FTA virtually eviscerated section 161(v). It no longer applies to Canada,
by far the largest supplier to the United States, and it is thus highly un-
likely that the domestic uranium industry could offer any proof in a liti-
gation or administrative proceeding that enrichment restrictions against
the remaining producer countries would make a whit of difference to its
fair imports is a "substantial cause" of threatened or actual injury to domestic producers. Upon a
positive finding, the President must, with some discretion, provide for protective relief (e.g., tariffs or
quotas) or adjustment assistance to workers, firms, and communities. 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1988). See
also R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON, & J. SPANOGLE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 275-76
(3d ed. 1988). Consultation should occur with affected GATT members prior to imposition of § 201
action. Similarly, GATT article XIX enables a party to suspend most-favored-nation treatment and
tariff concessions upon an injury finding. GATT, supra note 7, art. XIX. Such actions are to be
taken only in an unforseen emergency and only as long as necessary to meet the emergency. RE-
STATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 108, at § 808 comment a. Affected countries
compensate by suspending equivalent concessions or obligations. GATT, supra note 7, art. XIX(3).
See also US. Under No GAT' Obligation to Enrich Non-US. Ufor Domestic Use, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 3 (Sept. 9, 1985).
The uranium industry has never attempted such relief, possibly because it has been urged to rely
on § 161(v) instead. 134 CONG. REc. S3326 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988)(statement of Sen. Wallop).
The USTR has also advised against such an action because it felt that the ITC would likely find
reduced demand, rather than imports, was the major problem. The USTR also believed that the
ITC would find that industry problems were long-term because of the comparative advantage of the
exporters and thus the short-term relief authorized under § 201 would not revitalize the industry.
Letter from Ambassador Clayton Yeutter (USTR) to John Herrington (Sec'y, DOE)(Dec. 26, 1985),
reprinted in 134 CONG. REc. S3334-35 [hereinafter Yeutter-Herrington Letter]. A § 201 investiga-
tion is also tied to the uranium industry through § 170B of the AEA, although initiation of such
investigation is discretionary with the DOE. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(d). See infra notes 140-44 and
accompanying text.
134 F'!A Implementation Hearings, supra note 132, at 106 (statement of Sen. Domenici).
135 Gooding, Uranium-the Most Political Energy Resource, Fin. Times, Nov. 10, 1988, at 40,
col. 2 [hereinafter Gooding].
136 Canada has interpreted the FTA's UF6 upgrade exception for the United States to include
uranium refined and converted for use in the United States, or uranium refined, converted, and
enriched in the United States for reexport. See Canadian Government Interprets Uranium Upgrading
Policy Exception in FTA, NUCLEARFUEL, Jan. 9, 1989, at 4.
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viability. 137
G. Recent Efforts to Aid the Uranium Industry
Legislative campaigns to reimpose limitations on enrichment or use
of foreign uranium were mounted even as the section 161(v) restrictions
were being phased out in the early 1980s.138 These measures met with
stiff resistance from the executive branch, which cited GAT and other
trade norms in opposition. 139 Supporters of the uranium industry in the
Senate continue to propose. protectionist legislation, but the House and
the Executive branch continue to oppose them, especially now because of
the FTA.
1. AEA Section 170B and National Security Investigations
The 1983 addition of section 170B to the AEA of 195414 mandated
a national security investigation under section 232 of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962141 under certain import conditions.14 2 Section 232 pro-
tection has been available since 1962, but section 170B added an
automatic trigger provision for the uranium industry. 143 A study was
triggered in late 1988, but section 170B only requires such a study; it
137 One producer explained: "We can't make the factual record on viability if 30 million pounds
of Canadian uranium starts coming into the U.S.... If you have all this stuff coming in, then you
can't say that restricting imports of Australian uranium is going to make you viable." Confirmation
of FTA Expected by Year-End as Canadians Re-Elect Conservative Gov't., NUCLEARFUEL, Nov. 28,
1988, at 1. In addition, Canada could merely step up production shielded by the FTA to compensate
for restrictions on imports from other countries.
138 See DOE Sees Stability of World Uranium Market Enhanced by Risk to Domestic Industry,
NUCLEARFUEL, Aug. 31, 1981, at 8. A 1981 DOE report weighed options to control uranium
imports, if necessary in the future, including postponing the relaxation of enrichment restrictions,
setting import ceilings, negotiating voluntary export restraints with foreign producers, imposing tar-
iffs to equalize production costs, increasing tails assay requirements to boost demand, creating buffer
stocks, and reestablishing a government purchase program. Id. See also Embargo Jibes with GA7T,
Proponents Say, NUCLEARFUEL, June 7, 1982, at 14 [hereinafter Embargo Jibes].
139 See, e.g., Uranium Import Quota Proposals Face Continued State Department Hostility,
NUCLEARFUEL, Oct. 10, 1983, at 6. Carlton Stoiber, Director of the State Department Office of
Nuclear Export and Import Control, stated: "We strongly believe that the national interest-prop-
erly assessed-would best be served by a world uranium market which is not significantly con-
strained by the domestic laws of any producer or consumer nation." Id.
140 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
141 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 872, 877 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1802 (1988)).
142 The statute requires that if executed contracts or options exceed 37.5% of actual or projected
domestic requirements for two consecutive years, the DOE must request the Commerce Department
to determine the effects on national security. 42 U.S.C. § 2210b(e)(1) (Supp. 1988).
143 The DOE can also request the Commerce Department to initiate a section 232 investigation if
the DOE itself determines that imports "may threaten to impair the national security." Id.
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does not mandate import restrictions. 144
Generally, section 232 empowers the president to "adjust" imports
of an article if the Commerce Department finds it is being "imported into
the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair national security."' 145 One commentator, after exam-
ining the statutory language, history, and application, has concluded that
section 232 "is designed to limit imports of critical defense materials es-
pecially in order to protect the domestic production base or to protect
against an embargo by an important foreign supplier."1 46 This formula-
tion of section 232 seemingly would apply to uranium.
In practice, however, only the domestic oil industry has ever re-
ceived section 232 protection. 147 The statute has never been applied to
protect the uranium industry or any other industry producing a com-
modity or product like uranium. 48  An oil industry coalition in 1987
requested another section 232 investigation, voicing concerns similar to
those voiced by the uranium industry. 4 9 Although the Commerce De-
144 The DOE found that imports constituted 43.8% of domestic requirements in 1986 and 51.1%
in 1987, and requested an investigation. The president of the Uranium Producers Association be-
lieved that "this study will highlight the risks involved in letting one or two foreign governments,
however friendly, dominate the domestic uranium market." See Herrington Says U Industry Non-
viable, Calls for National Security Study, NUCLEARFUEL, Jan.9, 1989, at 13 [hereinafter Herrington
Says]. Criteria to be evaluated pursuant to 15 C.F.R. § 705.4 (1988) include the quantity and cir-
cumstances of importation, the domestic production and capacity needed to meet national security
needs, the availability of labor and capital, the impact of foreign competition on economic welfare,
and the impact of imports on the strength of the industry to meet security requirements. Initiation
of National Security Investigation of Imports of Uranium, 54 Fed. Reg. 8225 (Feb. 27, 1989).
145 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1988). Any interested party can initiate an investigation, which must be
performed in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. The President can decide not to impose
restrictions if he finds that there is no threat to security. Id. § 1862(c).
146 Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard US. Legal Regime, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1200-02 (1987).
147 Oil was first protected in 1958 by a predecessor statute to § 232 via an import quota system.
With world prices at below $2 per barrel and the domestic price at $3 per barrel, the oil industry
argued that imports would force the U.S. price down, rendering costly wells unprofitable and inhib-
iting development of reserves. The United States would thus become more dependent on imports
and vulnerable to supply disruptions. G. HUFBAUER, D. BERLINER & K. ELLIOT, TRADE PROTEC-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES: 31 CASE STUDIES 345 (1986). Subsequent administrations have lim-
ited oil imports via § 232 for varying economic and political reasons. See Federal Energy Admin. v.
Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976)(upholding license fees imposed under Presidents Nixon
and Ford). The case did not define the proper uses of the statute, however. Carter, supra note 146,
at 1201 n.157.
148 Section 232 investigations into the threat to security from imports of commodities such as
chromium, manganese, and silicon ferroalloys have been unavailing for these industries. See Carter,
supra note 146, at 1201 n.157.
149 "The possibility of our oil supplies quickly drying up in a conflict at the same time that the
country's domestic industry is rapidly pulling back, with operating wells being capped and relatively
little exploration and new drilling should scare the daylights out of serious national security plan-
ners." Oil Industry Group Asks Commerce to Probe When Imports Are Threat to U.S. Security, 4
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partment found a threat to national security,"' ° neither the Secretary of
Commerce nor the President recommended that imports be restricted,
arguing that it would not be cost effective,151 and it would in the long run
actually impair national security.
152
The same analysis applies to the uranium industry. Prior overregu-
lation, protectionism, and reliance on long-term contracts instead of spot
markets, 153 have distorted both the uranium and petroleum markets and
resulted in overinvestment and overproduction. Both industries are ad-
justing to a market driven by international supply and demand, and it
does not appear in either case that the national security of the United
States is threatened by import penetration.154
Neither the uranium industry nor its allies in the Senate have initi-
ated a section 232 investigation. 155 The USTR had claimed that section
232 was not applicable because "[u]ranium for military uses is not an
issue here, but only uranium for commercial electric generation. The
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1494 (Dec. 2, 1987). Oil imports recently exceeded domestic output for the
first time in a decade. Wald, Oil Imports in January Topped Output in U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,
1989, at 25, col. 4 (nat'l ed.).
150 Presidential Decision; Petroleum Section 232 National Security-Import Investigation 54 Fed.
Reg. 6556-57 (Feb. 13, 1989). The Commerce Department found that while energy security had
improved since the last study, it was still concerned with supply disruptions caused by declining
domestic production, rising imports, and growing dependence on insecure foreign sources. The re-
port concluded that since oil access was "essential to our economic security, foreign policy flexibility
and defense preparedness," a threat to national security existed. Id. at 6558. However, the Depart-
ment found that the United States could meet its "defense requirements and essential industrial and
civilian needs in a major conventional war" from domestic production, reserves and reliable im-
ports." Id. A study by the National Petroleum Council also concluded that the United States could
withstand a "sudden and sustained loss of oil imports" without shortages, although prices would
rise. See Cutoff of Oil Imports Studied, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1989, at 31, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
151 Section 232 recognizes the "close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our na-
tional security .. " 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c). The Commerce Department feared that oil import restric-
tions would raise the price of oil, allowing a small temporary increase in domestic production, but
also increasing costs with severe adverse competitive impact. 54 Fed. Reg. at 6559. It was estimated
that a $10 per barrel import fee would result in an overall loss to the economy of $150 billion to $200
billion from 1988 to 1995. Id. (citing DOE, ENERGY SECURITY (1987)). See also Bradley, There's
No Energy Crisis Brewing, N.Y. Times, Feb, 8, 1989, at 23, col. 2 (nat'l ed.)(market-driven oil market
less prone to dislocation)[hereinafter Bradley].
152 54 Fed. Reg. at 6559. The Commerce Department found that since the last section 232 inves-
tigation in 1979, U.S. energy security had improved as a result of price decontrol, filling of the
strategic reserve, and drawdown agreements with foreign allies. Government programs stimulating
oil production and the FTA were also cited. Id. at 6558.
153 See Bradley, supra note 151 ("a vast spot market and oil trading network have replaced the
rigid long term contract market of the 1970s"). Long-term contracts also governed uranium supply
in the 1970s. See supra notes 60-64.
154 Since the enactment of § 161(v) the Executive Branch has favored unconstrained uranium
imports, and thus a positive finding might not result in import limitations. FTA Energy Hearings
supra, note 110, at 203 (statement of Robert Reinstein, USTR). See note 189, infra.
155 134 CONG. REc. S3329 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988)(Statement of Sen. Packwood).
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principal source of imports is Canada, an immediate neighbor and a long
time stable ally." '15 6 As Professor Jackson has pointed out, "[t]he over-
all U.S. trade policy in which Section 232 finds its place is and has been
to promote national security by expanding world trade."1" 7
2. More Recent Attempts and the Subsidy Issue
The focus of efforts to aid the uranium industry is likely to shift
from forms of protection to subsidies. Senate bill 2097, an example of the
former, would have replaced section 161(v) restrictions with sliding scale
charges based on the percentage of foreign uranium included in new fuel
assemblies loaded in all reactors of a single nuclear licensee. 58 The im-
port use penalties of the bill came under attack from other legislators,159
the USTR,16° and the press 161 as violating the FTA. The Bill passed the
Senate, 162 but died at the adjournment of the 100th Congress.
This resistance led the Reagan Administration, and the uranium in-
dustry and their proponents in the Senate, to strike a compromise.
1 63
156 Yeutter-Herrington Letter, supra note 133.
157 J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 948 (1977)[here-
inafter J. JACKSON, CASEBOOK].
158 Up to 37.5% foreign uranium could be utilized without charge, with hefty charges of $ 200 to
$ 500 per kilogram assesed for greater amounts. S. 2097, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 110, 112, 113
(1988). Prior embodiments of the Uranium Revitalization, Tailings Reclamation and Enrichment
Act of 1987 featured other forms of protection. See, eg., S. 1100, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)(vol-
untary restraint agreement with foreign uranium producers to assure 50% domestic uranium con-
tained in aggregate of new fuel assemblies loaded in all domestic civilian power reactori).
159 Senators Evans and Bradley led a narrowly defeated attempt to excise the "crushing tariff"
from the bill, claiming that it would violate "absolutely the most fundamental spirit of the [FTA]."
134 CONG. REC. 53327 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988) (statement of Sen. Evans). The remaining titles
addressed uranium mill tailings cleanup and the fate of the money losing DOE enrichment program
through creation of a government owned enrichment enterprise. The GAO estimated unrecovered
costs at nine billion dollars, although the exact amount has generated a good deal of controversy.
GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 17. Since § 161(v) requires full cost recovery for enrichment serv-
ices, the DOE may face further legal challenges.
160 Robert Reinstein of the Office of the USTR noted that the import limitations would violate
chapter five of the FTA, which incorporated the GATT prohibition against national treatment. See
FTA Implementation Hearings, supra note 132, at 129 (statement of Robert Reinstein, USTR). The
sliding charges can be viewed as a differential tax on foreign goods which "shall not be subject ... to
internal taxes or other internal charges in excess of those applied ... to like domestic products."
GATT, supra 'note 7, art. 111(2). See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 279-80.
161 A New York Times editorial cast doubt upon whether "so flimsy a pretext" as national secur-
ity could justify protecting an industry merely suffering from low demand. Editorial, Why Protect
Uranium, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1988, at 18, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
162 Senate Votes to Aid Uranium Industry, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1988, at 8, col. 4 (nat'l ed.).
163 Western Senators Pushing for U Bill Apart from FT4 as Miners Eye Court NUCLEARFUEL,
Aug. 22, 1988, at 8 [hereinafter Western Senators Pushing]; U.S. Miners Expected to Drop DOE Suit
if New Canadian government Okay's FTA, NUCLEARFUEL Oct. 31, 1988 at 6 [hereinafter U.S. Min-
ers Expected to Drop DOE Suit].
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The resulting proposed legislation replaced the stiff tariffs of Senate bill
2097 with a government purchase program, in which a "Uranium Revi-
talization Fund" would be established to purchase $750 million of do-
mestic uranium over five years. The bill also provides a billion dollars for
uranium mill tailings cleanup. 64 Since both the utilities and the DOE
already maintained significant uranium stockpiles, the additional ura-
nium from the purchase program would be used to "overfeed" the en-
richment process. This would waste a great deal of feed uranium even
though it would result in significant, but not fully offsetting, electrical
power cost savings in the enrichment process. 165 Also, AEA sections
16 1(v) and 170B would be repealed, resulting in "free market conditions"
for uranium by 1995.166
It was hoped that the compromise would assist the uranium indus-
try and "not violate the spirit of GATT or the letter of the [FTA]."'
167
While such legislation might not be trade restrictive, the difference be-
tween the value of uranium overfed and the electrical cost savings, as
well as the money saved by the industry in using government mill tailings
cleanup funds instead of its own, would amount to subsidies. These can
be problematic with GATT 168 and would create an inconsistency with
the U.S. position as it tries to negotiate the reduction of Canadian ura-
nium subsidies under the auspices of the FTA. 169 There were accusa-
tions of trying to sneak the legislation through the House, and so the bill
was sent back through the hearing process, effectively killing it for the
100th Congress.1
71
Government involvement might be considered the Achilles' heel of
the goal of open trade in civilian-use uranium, because governments of
all uranium producing countries, 171 including the United States, 172 inter-
164 See Summary of Uranium Package for the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement and
Comparison to S. 2097, reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S11,088 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988)[hereinafter
Summary of Uranium Package]. The sponsors attached the language to the Nuclear Regulation
Reorganization and Reform Act, S. 2443, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), leaving the tailings reclama-
tion and government enrichment corporation programs of S. 2097 intact. The uranium purchases
would be financed by $300 million from the mining industry itself, $450 million from the new gov-
ernment enrichment corporation, and one billion dollars from the utilities, charged at $72 per kilo-
gram for new uranium regardless of origin. Id.
165 See Power Savings from Overfeeding, reprinted in 134 Cong. Rec. S11,081 (daily ed. Aug. 8,
1988).
166 See Summary of Uranium Package, supra note 164, at S.11,088.
167 134 CONG. REc. S11,077 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
168 GATT, supra note 7, at art. 111(8); J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 365-68.
169 See Yeutter-Simpson Letter, supra note 132.
170 Franklin, U.S. Aid to Uranium Mining Meets Political Resistance, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1988,
at 21, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
171 The miners have alleged that the federal and provincial governments in Canada, for instance,
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vene in uranium production activities. Neither the producers nor the
United States government have ified a countervailing duty petition be-
cause of a perception that it would be unavailing and because of the exist-
ence of the section 161(v) protective measures. 173  Free market
arguments can apply only when vestigial government involvement, which
is unrelated to safety and nonproliferation, is reduced.
Legislation assisting the uranium industry has already been intro-
duced in the 101st Congress.17 4 It is unlikely, however, that a blatantly
protectionist bill will pass this session, because it cannot apply to Cana-
dian uranium, and it is doubtful that Congress would place the entire
restrictive burden on essentially a single country, especially as close an
ally as Australia. Such legislation might also expose the United States to
sanctions provided under the GATT dispute resolution procedure.17
have ownership and investment interests and participate in such activities as debt write-offs, loan
guarantees and long-term government purchase contracts at well above spot prices. FTA Oversight
Hearings, supra note 128 at 249-51 (statement of John Adams, Energy Fuels Corp.). Canadian
producers have responded that the governments intended to privatize production facilities, that gov-
ernment ownership was notper se a subsidy, that forgiven loans were eventually paid back, and that
the long-term purchase contracts did not benefit exporters. See Canadian U Producers Response to
Unfair Trade Practice Claims, NUCLEARFUEL, June 13, 1988, at 5. For the uranium industry's
reply, see Uranium Producers ofAmerica-A Response to Canadian Arguments Against Legislation to
Maintain a Domestic Uranium Industry, reprinted in 134 CONG. REc. S3333-34 (daily ed. Mar. 30,
1988). See also Owen, Mixed Fortunes Delay Cameco Flotation Plans, Fin. Times, Mar. 3, 1989, at
24, col. 6 (privatization of worlds's largest uranium company, created by merger of two Canadian
government-owned firms and accounting for 16% of world output and 15-20% of U.S. supply, likely
to be delayed by weak spot market).
172 The USTR noted that the U.S. government owned the enrichment operation and participated
in as many equivalent areas as the Canadian government. See USTR, Government Role in the Ura-
nium Industry, reprinted in FTA Implementation Hearings, supra note 132, at 122-23.
173 134 CONG. REc. 53326 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988) (statement of Sen. Wallop). Producers testi-
fied that countervailing duty and antidumping laws in the United States were too narrowly drawn to
provide relief, and thus they had relied on § 161(v) instead. FTA Oversight Hearings, supra, note
128, at 54 (statement of John Adams, Energy Fuels Corp.). The USTR's office said that the govern-
ment would not initiate a countervailing duty investigation because it would not be "effective or
appropriate." Yeutter-Herrington Letter, supra note 133. The FTA itself calls for a binational panel
to review final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations by the administrative agencies
of the respective countries when imports of the other country are at issue. FTA, supra note 22, at
art. 1904.1. In the United States, an agency of the Department of Commerce makes subsidy and
dumping determinations, and the ITC decides whether these have resulted in injury. There may be a
question of the constitutionality of allowing non-Article III judges to rule on a case, and whether the
panel system is inconsistent with the Article II appointments clause. See Baker & Battram, The
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 23 INT'L LAw. 37, 77-80 (1989).
174 See, eg., Ford Introduces SWU Bill in Senate, Amendments to Add Industry Relief,
NUCLEARFUEL, Feb. 20, 1989, at 5. The provisions of the 1988 compromise are featured in one
such attempt. See 135 CONG. REc. 53159 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1989).
175 Though there is no sharply defined dispute resolution process, about thirty provisions appear
throughout GATT. See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 164-66. Two major procedures are described
in articles XXII and XXIII. The first sets up a two-step process in which each Contracting Party
must first "afford adequate opportunity for consultation" with any other party. GATT, supra note
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The current session will thus probably yield only mill tailings and gov-
ernment enrichment corporation legislation, with the possibility of some
form of subsidy.'76 However, the senators representing mining states
have shown their resourcefulness in the past and are likely to continue
their attempts in future sessions to get a protective formulation past the
House, with the resulting collision with the GATT goal of nondiscrimi-
natory trade. 177 It is with this in mind that we next examine provisions
of GATT applicable to past enrichment restrictions, and which might
come into play with future restrictive laws.
III. GATT AND RESTRICTIONS ON URANIUM TRADE
In 1988, the United States raised its commitment to abide by GATT
in formulating trade policies and to extend GATT's coverage to addi-
tional products. 178 Prior to the passage of the FTA, the United States
considered trade in uranium products to be controlled by GATT for its
own ends, because the United States challenged Canada's uranium up-
grading policy under article XI. 179 The United States, upon execution of
7, art. XXII. If this fails to bring a satisfactory result, the dispute can be referred to the Contracting
Parties for joint consultation. Under article XXIII, a party can approach other parties concerned if
either a GATT benefit has been "nullified or impaired," or the attainment of any objective of GATT
is being impeded by any of the following: a "failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations" under GATT; the application of a measure "whether or not it conflicts with the provi-
sions" of GATT, or "any other situation." GATT, supra note 7, art. XXII(l). This article is thus
triggered not only for direct GATT violations, but also for any other action that interferes with the
goals of GATT. This wide net is limited by the requirement of a showing of actual injury. J. JACK-
SON, supra note 8, at 178-82. If the parties are unable to come to terms, the matter can be referred to
the Contracting Parties, who then must investigate, make recommendations or rulings, and author-
ize, if necessary, remedial suspension of concessions. GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII(2). See
deKieffer, GA TT Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in International and U.S. Trade Law, 2 Nw.
J. INT'L LAW & Bus. 317 (1980).
176 See U. S. Miners Expected to Drop DOE Suit, supra, note 163.
177 Senate Uranium Measure Goes to House; Vote Could be Omen for US.-Canada Pact,
NUCLEARFUEL, April 18, 1988. at 2.
178 "The principle negotiating objectives of the United States regarding the improvement of
GATT ... are- A) to enhance the status of GATT; B) to improve the operation and extend the
coverage of the GA TT .... to products, sectors and conditions of trade not adequately covered."
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, § 1101(b)(2)(A)(B), 102 Stat.
1107, 1121 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(2)(A)(B) (1988)) (emphasis added).
179 Prior to the FTA, Canada required that uranium be upgraded to the greatest extent possible
prior to export, and Canada had the capability to upgrade to UF6 . GATT, Canada-Restrictions on
Exports of Unprocessed Uranium, (L/6104)(Dee. 12, 1986.) The United States believed that this
amounted to an export restriction in violation of article XI of GATT, "nullifying or impairing" its
benefits, and requested consultation under the GATT dispute resolution process. Id. Canada had
utilized the policy to maintain pressure on the United States in light of the Western Nuclear litiga-
tion, the continued existence of § 161(v), efforts by Congress to pass new restrictions on uranium
trade, and as part of its push for free energy trade in the FTA. U.S. Files Formal GAT T Protest Over
Canada's Upgrading Policy, NUCLEARFUEL, Jan. 12, 1987 at 1.
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the United States-Canada FTA, began an era in which it acknowleged
that trade in uranium products destined for use in civilian nuclear reac-
tors is controlled by GATT for Canada as well. 8 ' Even without the
FTA, this section argues that GATT controls all multilateral trade in
civilian-use uranium by its own terms.18'
A. Relevant Operational Provisions
L National Treatment: GATTArticle III
Article III prohibits a government 182 from utilizing taxation i8 3 or
regulation to favor domestic production.8 4 It instead requires a country
to provide "national treatment," that is, imported products must be "ac-
corded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products
of national origin."1
8 1
The uranium enrichment criteria, until 1984, served to limit the
180 Since Canada and domestic sources supply the vast majority of the U.S. civilian needs, virtu-
ally all commerce in civilian use uranium is under GATT control by operation of the FTA. See
supra note 110.
181 Arguments can be made that § 161(v) or other restrictive statutes should supercede GATT,
since a constitutional statute passed later in time trumps an earlier conflicting international treaty.
See Canada Brief, supra note 58, at 9; Australia Brief, supra note 58, at 5-6. Construction of such
statutes, however, should be made to harmonize the two. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW, supra note 108, at § 114. The later act supersedes the treaty if the intent to supersede was
clear, or if the earlier rule "cannot be fairly reconciled." Id. at § 11 5(1)(a). It is, however, "gener-
ally assumed that Congress does not intend to repudiate an international obligation" such as GATT
"by making it impossible ... to carry out its obligations." Id. at § 115(1)(a), comment a. Congress
expressly stated that section 161(v) was consistant with GATE, although such an ipse dixit does not
make it so. See 1964 REPORT, supra note 17, at 3121. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
182 Because GATT is an agreement among sovereigns, it affects only matters under governmental
control. J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 273, 289-90.
183 GATT, supra note 7, at art. 111(2). For example, the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (Oct. 17, 1986), included a tax which
created a greater liability on imported oil than domestic. See Uhlfelder, Superfund Tax May Violate
GAT," Oil Import Fee May be Foreclosed, 35 TAX NOTES, June 15, 1987, at 1045. Mexico claimed
the differential tax violated GATT article III, and a GATT panel was formed. CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES TO THE GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES 1986, at 61-62 (1987)[hereinafter GATE ACTIVITIES
1986]. In what has become a model for expeditious adjudication of a dispute, the panel ruled that
the tax discriminated against imports in violation of the provision for national treatment on internal
taxation, and suggested that the Contracting Parties recommend that the United States conform the
tax to GATE. GATT ACTIVITIES 1987, supra note 14, at 70. See also United States-Taxes on
Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances Report of the Panel Adopted on 17 June 1987 (L/61 75),
in BISD, supra note 108 (34th Supp. 1988), at 136. GATE-sanctioned retaliation against the United
States may be in the offing because Congress has not eliminated the tax and thus has not complied
with the ruling. Trade Row Between U.S. and Canada Worsens, Fin. Times, Apr. 7, 1989, at 6, col.
3.
184 The most-favored-nation principle, supra note 13, prohibits governmental discrimination
against imports of different countries but does not speak to favoring domestic products, which might
be a "basic human urge." See J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 273-74.
185 GATT, supra note 7, art. 111(4).
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ability of domestic utilities to obtain enrichment services for foreign ura-
nium, thereby restricting their ability to purchase and utilize imported
uranium. This resulted in differential treatment between foreign and do-
mestic uranium. Article III requires the parties to recognize that "laws,
regulations and requirements" affecting 186 "the internal sale ... purchase
... or use," as well as "internal quantitative regulations requiring...
processing ... of products in specified amounts," can protect domestic
production 187 and are thus impermissible. 188 Congress in 1964 expressly
afforded protection to the domestic uranium industry despite a superfi-
cial nod to GATT. 189  The inquiry thus shifts to whether this GATT
violative administrative action1 9° or any other trade restrictions legisla-
186 The term "affecting" extends the national treatment obligation to "any laws or regulations
which might adversely modify the conditions of competition between the domestic and imported
products on the internal market." J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 288 (quoting Italian Discrimination
Against Imported Agricultural Machinery (L/833)(Oct. 23, 1958), in BISD, supra note 100, at 60, 64
(7th Supp. 1959)). The reach of article III is wide because national treatment is considered more
onerous than tariff protection. J. JACKSON, CASEBOOK, supra note 157, at 573. See 0. LONG, supra
note 10, at 9 (wide scope is "defense against protectionism resulting from internal administrative and
legislative measures").
187 GATT, supra note 7, art. 111(1).
188 Id. at art. 111(4), (5).
189 See 1964 REPORT, supra note 17, at 3120-21. The State Department also realized the enrich-
ment restrictions collided with article III of GATT. A spokesman noted that the "discriminatory
limitations on the domestic use of enriched foreign ore would be in direct conflict with ... this
Government's long-standing policy of promoting.., its international commitments under [GATT]."
But since the restrictions were only transitional "within the framework of a significant gradual liber-
alization of AEC nuclear fuel supply practices," the State Department did not object. Johnson-
Seaborg Letter, supra note 53. This was "on the understanding that the situation will be kept under
continuing examination with a view to avoiding the imposition of restrictions or to relaxing any
restrictions when and to the degree that this can be done consistent with the national interest." Id.
Joseph Greenwald, Director of the State Department Office of International Trade, later testified to
the JCAE that "discriminatory limitations on the domestic use of enriched foreign ores would be in
direct conflict with our international commitments under [art. 111(4) ofn GAIT." 1964 Hearings,
supra note 4, at 336. He also stated that this might only be a technical violation if transitional, and
thus could remain consistent "with the [GATT] spirit as long as we made it clear we are trying to
move to complete compliance with the GATT provision." Id. at 337.
190 There seemed to be some confusion expressed by the mining states in their opposition to the
petition for writ of certiorari in the Western Nuclear litigation that the USTR maintained at one time
that the DOE's offering of enrichment was a service and therefore not within the purview of GATT.
See Australia Brief, supra note 58, at 9-11. Since uranium is useless as a light-water nuclear reactor
fuel without enrichment, denial of a service essential to the utilization of an imported good is also
differing national treatment. This is supported by the fact that § 161(v) does not apply to foreign
uranium enriched for re-export. See Canada Brief, supra note 58, at 10.
Trade in services accounts for nearly one-third of the over two trillion dollar flow of world
commerce, and thus it may only be a matter of time before GATT is expanded to encompass serv-
ices. See Nelson, GA YT Nations Settle Dispute Imperiling Talks, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1989, at A3,
col. 1 (midwest ed.) In fact, the national treatment provisions of GATT are cited as requiring incor-
porating services into GATT. Veale, Spiegelman & Ronkainen, Trade in Services: The U.S. Position,
I 1 FLETCHER FORUM 21, 26-27 (1987). The GATT negotiations in Montreal established a frame-
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tion is sheltered by GATT's national security exception.
2. Free Entry: Articles II and XI
Articles II and XI construed together also require free entry of for-
eign uranium into the United States. Article II(1)(a) provides that "each
contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting
parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appro-
priate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement." '191
The referent schedule is the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States, which currently provides for importation of uranium in most of
its forms free of tariffs.
192
Article XI assures that domestic measures do not negate these tariff
concessions: "No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties . . .
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained ... on the importation
of any product." '193 This flat prohibition is broad enough to apply to all
kinds of nontariff barriers not otherwise addressed in GATT, and not
merely to quantitative barriers.1 94 Thus, an enrichment or other type of
restriction might contravene Article XI even if it does not violate Article
111.195
B. National Security Exception
National security has been described as a "classic exception" to the
goals of free trade.196 Nations assert the exception because the welfare
loss generated by trade controls protecting industries deemed vital to na-
work for talks to liberalize trade in services. Farnsworth, Trade Talks Stall on Farm Policy, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 9, 1988, at 33, col. 3 (nat'l ed.). This movement is especially popular among post-
industrial countries whose economies are becoming increasingly service based. See also Signs of
Progress on Yardsticks for Liberalising Services, Fin. Times, Dec. 1, 1988, at 4, col. 1 (impediments to
progress in services negotiations are enormity and complexity of scope and difficulty in defining
problem).
191 GAIT, supra note 7, art. II(l)(a). Each Contracting Party submits its own tariff schedules
which are incorporated into the basic agreement. The combined schedules now dwarf the GATT
agreement. See Jackson, Recent Problems, supra note 8, at 10.
192 The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is published pursuant to the Omnibus
Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3007 (1988). See supra note 112 for a description of headings for uranium.
193 GAIT, supra note 7, art. XI(l).
194 K. DAM, supra note 11, at 151. "The American draftsmen of the General Agreement tended
to view quantitative restrictions as the incarnation of international commercial evil." Id. at 148.
This is complementary with Article III whose prohibitions control treatment after importation while
Article XI dictates the manner of importation itself. J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 315.
195 See also Australia Brief, supra note 58, at 8-9. The United States used artilcle XI to challenge
a Canadian uranium export policy. See supra note 179.
196 J. JACKSON, CASEBOOK, supra note 157, at 941.
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tional security is outweighed by the incalculable benefit of preservation of
the state.197 The exception, as embodied in article XXI of GATT, pro-
vides a "dangerous loophole" to the goal of free trade,198 because it has
been interpreted to empower individual states to make unilateral deci-
sions as to what are "essential security interests."' 99 Thus, the reach of
article XXI is limited only by self-control and the effectiveness of the
GATT dispute resolution machinery.20 In 1982, the GATT body began
to urge itself to make a formal interpretation of the applicability of the
exception, despite the inherent difficulties involved and resistance from
some members.2 °1
Uranium used to arm nuclear weapons and to propel nuclear pow-
ered military vessels falls within any definition of a security exception.
This does not mean, however, that the exception applies to trade in ura-
nium used for civilian power plants when separate supply channels
exist.2 °2
1. GATT Article XXI
Article XXI provides specific exceptions to the general nondiscrimi-
natory trade scheme of GATT for fissionable materials, and for goods
197 Id.
198 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 748.
199 The United States proposed inclusion of article XXI in GATr, its delegate explicitly noting
this implicit power: "some latitude must be granted for security as opposed to commercial pur-
poses." U.N.Doc. E/PC/T/A/SR/33, at 3 (1947). The Dutch delegate had inquired whether the
exception could be worded to clarify its intended interpretation. Id. An attempt to amend another
proposed GATT article by authorizing parties to "take exceptional action to protect vital national
interests," was resisted for fear that "[d]ifficult situations were likely to arise," and that the GATT
charter would become rife with similar insertions. U.N. Doc. E/PC/f/A/SR/40(2), at 5 (1947).
For a discussion of the scope of article XXI, see Comment, The Politics of Procedure: An Examina-
tion of the GATT Dispute Settlement and the Article XXI Defense in the Context of the U.S. Embargo
of Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 603, 615-22 (1987)[hereinafter Comment, The Politics of
Procedure].
200 The chair of the GATT Preparatory Committee stated that "the spirit in which Members of
the Organization would interpret these provisions was the only guarantee against abuse." U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/A/SR 33, at 3 (1947). The only apparent limit within GATT was that article XXI was
subject to article XXIII(2) procedures, id. at 4-5, which allows suspension of concessions under
"serious circumstances." See supra note 175; see also Bollag, GA7T Acts to Speed Settlement of
Disputes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1989, at 32, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
201 Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, (L/5426)(Nov. 30, 1982) in BISD,
supra note 100, at 23-24 (29th Supp. 1983). They recognized that use of article XXI could disrupt
trade, introduce uncertainty, and affect accrual of benefits to the parties. The Contracting Parties
established interim procedural guidelines for recourse to article XXI, including notice of measures
taken. Id. A participant in the Uruguay Round negotiations requested a review of article XXI,
asking for consideration of GATT's competence relating to security matters. GATT AcTIvrrIs
1987, supra note 14, at 35-36.
202 See infra, Section IV; see generally, Santos, THe National Security Exception to Free Trade 30
FED. B. NEWS & J. 293 (1983)[hereinafter Santos].
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and materials supplying military establishments. There are other protec-
tions from which a general exception can be inferred.2"3 The "fissionable
materials" exception states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Contracting
Party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protec-
tion of its essential security interests relating to fissionable materials or the
materials from which they are derived.204
Obviously, uranium dioxide fuel assemblies are "fissionable materials,"
and uranium hexafiouride, yellowcake, uranium ores and oxides, and re-
lated physical or chemical intermediaries are "materials from which they
are derived."20 5
Article XXI also enables a Contracting Party to take action to pro-
tect its security interests in "traffic in arms, ammunition and implements
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on
directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establish-
ment."206 This section clearly would include uranium contained in nu-
clear weapons as "arms," or "ammunition," or as "implements of war,"
if these items were trafficked. It also would seem to apply to trade in fuel
utilized in reactors powering military vessels, as goods "directly" supply-
ing a "military establishment. ' 2 7 In addition, this clause arguably could
exempt trade in uranium used in civilian reactors as "traffic in other
goods and materials to supply a military establishment" because of the
term "indirectly. ' 208 Prior protection of the domestic uranium produ-
cers through trade-restrictive civilian enrichment restrictions was carried
out on the theory that such restrictions would "indirectly" assure a via-
ble industry and thus an adequate uranium supply for the military.
2. Prior Invocations of the GA TT Security Exception
There are few reported cases of countries invoking the exception,
probably because the exception itself permits nondisclosure of informa-
tion,20 9 and because secrecy is an essential element of national security
203 Additional sections relate to actions taken to prevent disclosure of information that will com-
promise security (art. XXI(a)); to actions taken in wartime or emergency in international relations
(art. XXI(b)(iii)); and to actions taken under the United Nations Charter to maintain peace (art.
XXI(c)).
204 GATT, supra note 7, art. XXI(b)(i).
205 See U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/SR/25, at 3 (1947).
206 GATr, supra note 7, art. XXI(b)(ii)(emphasis added).
207 The Australian delegate assumed "supplying a military establishment" included "all army,
navy and air force purposes," but asked for a clarifying amendment. U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/SR/
40(2), at 10 (1947).
208 The words "directly or indirectly" were added by amendment, although the U.S. delegate had
interpreted the initial language that way. Id. at 10-11.
209 "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to require any contracting party to furnish any
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activities in the first instance.210 Of the reported cases, most were politi-
cally motivated boycotts aimed at specific countries, and no case has ad-
dressed specific products usable as war material or fuel.
The first dispute arose when Czechoslovakia complained that U.S.
export licensing practices served to exclude that country."1 ' The United
States replied that its actions were within the ambit of article XXI, and
the Contracting Parties agreed. 2 ' Subsequent discussions revealed the
belief that "every country must have the last resort on questions relating
to its own security," so long as GATT was not undermined.213 One
party indicated that goods which "might contribute to war" fell under
the exception.214
In 1961, Ghana banned all imports from Portugal in an attempt to
pressure Portugal to free Angola, invoking articles XXI and XXXV. 215
A Ghanaian spokesman related his country's position on the stature of
national security considerations within GATT: "Under [article XXI]
each contracting party was the sole judge of what was necessary in its
essential security interests. There could therefore be no objection to
Ghana regarding the boycott of goods as justified by security
interests.
2 16
The rationale for Sweden's mid-1970s import quota for certain foot-
wear paralleled that used by the uranium industry. The Swedish govern-
ment maintained that the "decrease in domestic production had become
a threat to the planning of Sweden's economic defence in situations of
information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests." GATr,
supra note 7, art. XXI(a).
210 Professor Jackson believes that a reporting requirement would do little good for this reason,
and that states would exercise a security exception whether or not one was explicitly provided. J.
JACKSON, supra note 8, at 748.
211 GATT Doc. GATT/CP. 3/33, cited in J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 749.
212 GATT Docs. CP.3/38 (1949); CP.3/SR.22 (1949), cited in J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 749.
The U.S. suspension of GATT obligations with Czechoslovakia in 1951 and Peru's prohibition of
Czech imports in 1955 may have also been accomplished under article XXI. J. JACKSON, supra note
8, at 749-50.
213 GATT Doc. CP.3/SR.22, at 9 (1949), cited in J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 749. Apparently
the fledgling GATT had neither the "capacity nor the prestige" to criticize U.S. cold war policies.
R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 68, 279 (1975).
214 See Comment, The Politics of Procedure, supra note 199, at 618 n.94, (citing Non-discrimina-
tory Measures Notified by the Government of Ceylon Under Paragraph Six of Article XVIII, at 4
(1949), GATT Doc. GATT/CP.3/20, reprinted in 1985 GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX).
215 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 750-751.
216 Id. (quoting GATT Doc. SR. 19/12 at 196 (1961)). Similarly, the European Community justi-
fied the trade sanctions imposed on Argentina because of the Falkland Islands dispute by reference




emergency as an integral part of its security policy." '2 17 This policy re-
quired the "maintenance of a minimum domestic production capacity in
vital industries." '218 Although GATT members complained of the quota
before Sweden terminated it, the position of many countries is that main-
tenance of strong production of even civilian-oriented commodities guar-
antees production capability for potential military use or use in the event
of national emergency.219 Moreover, some governments maintain that
such production capability is necessary simply in order to maintain a
strong economy as the basic underpinning of a strong defense.
The most blatant abuse of article XXI was the U.S. trade embargo
of Nicaragua beginning in 1985. The United States initially reduced its
import quota for Nicaraguan sugar in 1983. Nicaragua complained, and
a GATT panel ruled against the United States, probably because the
United States did not invoke the national security or any other excep-
tion.220 When the quota reduction was expanded to a complete embargo,
the United States did cite article XXI, and in fact insisted as a precondi-
tion for its submission to the GATT panel's jurisdiction that the panel
not examine the validity of the U.S. recourse to article XXI.221 Shackled
in this way, the panel had no choice but to rule that the United States
was within its rights, but questioned the entire reasoning behind unilat-
eral invocation of article XXI.
222
3. Applicability to Uranium
Professor Jackson has suggested that article XXI might be used im-
properly to shelter otherwise protectionist measures under the security
exception umbrella.223 Prior claims that protecting civilian uranium sup-
pliers also protects military supply have given way to consideration of
whether civilian utilities, and thus consumers, must be forced to prop up
the ailing uranium producers for no apparent military purpose.
217 Minutes of Meeting Held in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 31 October 1975, GATT Doc.
C/M/109, at 8 (1975), quoted in Comment, The Politics of Procedure, supra note 199, at 619 nn. 99-
101.
218 Id.
219 The Japanese recently dug in their heels over U.S. attempts to open up the Japanese market to
rice imports, citing the need to maintain national security and a national identity, and the need to
avoid dependence on foreigners for basic food sources. Sanger, Japan's Sensitivity on Rice Issue,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1988, at 29, col. 3 (nat'l ed.).
220 United States-Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua; Report of the Panel adopted on 13 March
1984 (L/5607), in BISD, supra note 100, at 67 (31st Supp. 1985). The report also stated that the
embargo was inconsistent with GATT's basic aim of stable trade relations. Id -
221 CONTRACTING PARTIES TO GATT, GATT AclvrriEs 1985, 47-48 (1986).
222 See US. Embargo on Nicaragua Did Not Violate Obligations Under GA 7, Dispute Panel
Rules, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1368-69 (Nov. 12, 1986).
223 J. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 752.
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Currently, protection of domestic suppliers through trade restrictive
measures such as section 161(v) cannot be justified by the "fissionable
materials" exception.224 Since civilian uses for uranium were minimal in
the mid- and late 1940s when GATT was negotiated, the GATT drafters'
intent was likely to except only trade in uranium intended for military
use.22 The Australian negotiator in 1947 anticipated, however, that the
inclusion of the "fissionable materials" reference would "have an unfor-
tunate effect in the event that atomic energy became an important or
major source of industrial energy.
'226
In 1964, Congress loosened the government's grip on ownership and
use of nuclear fuel, but it recognized the connection between civilian use
of uranium, uranium industry viability, and defense. Perhaps a credible
argument could have been made that shielding the industry in the civil-
ian realm protected defense supply, and thus the "fissionable materials"
exception would apply. Even as Congress codified this connection within
section 161(v), and the AEC made it manifest by asserting its delegated
power by restricting enrichment, the State Department and countries im-
pacted by restrictions nonetheless complained that GATT was violated,
implying that article XXI did not apply. Further, the restrictions under
section 161(v) were founded on an infant industry startup premise, rather
than on article XXI exception grounds.22 7  The restrictions were in-
tended to be transitory. Thus, any article XXI arguments also would
have to have been transitory because once the civilian market became
active, it would have been difficult to justify an article XXI defense to a
GATT attack on the restrictions. Despite uranium's fissionable charac-
ter then, the first exclusion does not apply.
Furthermore, trade restrictive measures cannot be justified by article
XXI(b)(ii), which excepts limitations on goods and materials "directly or
indirectly .. . supplying a military establishment." In the 1940s and
1950s, virtually all U.S. purchases of foreign uranium "directly" supplied
224 GATT, supra note 7, art. XXI(b)(i).
225 Congress reported in 1964 when deciding to authorize enrichment restrictions that in 1946,
just prior to GATT negotiations, "[p]rivate industry was not permitted to own special nuclear
materials nor to own or operate nuclear power reactors or other facilities capable of producing
significant quantities of these same materials.... [A]tomic energy was a new and little understood
force. The atom was born of war .... 1964 REPORT, supra note 17, at 3109. At this time there was
"little demand for private participation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.... The generation of
economic power from the atom was still a goal in the distant future." Id. at 3110.
226 The delegate also worried that there were "trade problems associated with fissionable materi-
als" with respect to security. U.N. Doe. E/PC/T/A/SR/30 at 3-4 (1947). The delegate he indi-
cated that he would lodge a provisional reservation against the inclusion of the fissionable materials
exception. U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/SR/33 at 3 (1947).
227 1964 REPORT, supra note i7, at 3114-15.
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the military, and so arguably came under this exception. In the 1960s
and early 1970s, it was thought that maintaining a strong civilian market
for domestic uranium via restrictions on enrichment of foreign uranium
would also indirectly assure supplies for the military if the need for diver-
sion of supply arose. Once this assumption is disproven, however, the
"indirect" connection vanishes. As shown in Section IV, infra, the larg-
est foreign suppliers currently do not allow their uranium to be used for
military purposes, and they therefore fall outside the "direct" supply ex-
ception. Protecting domestic producers from foreign competition via re-
strictions on civilian use of foreign uranium no longer "indirectly"
assures military supplies because the United States can use only domestic
and stockpiled uranium for military use. Thus, this second exception
also is not applicable.
There may also be a "spirit" to the national security exception,
which countries invoke rather than resorting to specific sections of article
XXI.228 When the government of a country merely wishes to shelter an
activity from GATT, or it actually feels its security threatened, it simply
does what it feels it must.229 The Czechoslovakia, Ghana, and Nicaragua
cases fall under this category, but relate more to political agendas than
specific commodities. They thus bear little similarity to the uranium
case. The Swedish shoe case came somewhat closer to a legitimate use of
the general exception, but because of the availability of substitute supply,
and the attenuated connection between footwear and national security, a
general security exception defense would fail. As will be seen, the nexus
between civilian reactor fuel uranium (in a "non-nonproliferation" sense)
and national security is also too tenuous to withstand scrutiny as realisti-
cally coming under the national defense exception to the GATT con-
tract. The U.S. sugar embargo did not withstand GATT scrutiny under
article XXI, and it sandbagged the GATT panel on the issue after impos-
ing the total embargo.
The question then becomes to what extent will the United States be
willing to allow the weakening of an uncompetitive defense related indus-
try in order to exploit the comparative advantage of efficient (or at least
subsidized) foreign producers.230 The next section shows that the advan-
228 Signatories realized early on that the preeminance of political issues over free trade norms was
a 'fait accompli." See Abbott, supra note 11, at 853.
229 There is a temptation to invoke the national security exception if for no other reason than to
protect a failing industry. Santos, supra note 202, at 293.
230 See id. at 294. The comparitive advantage theory, developed by David Ricardo in the early
nineteenth century, posits that every country should produce what it can most efficiently, and trade
with other countries for their most efficiently produced goods. R. LiPsEY & P. STEINER, EcONOM-
Ics 740 (4th ed. 1975).
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tage can be exploited concurrently with maintaining a viable-albeit
much smaller-domestic industry, while preserving domestic reserves for
actual defense emergencies.
IV. SEPARATION OF MARKETS AND CONCLUSION
The domestic uranium industry received protection from import
competition through enrichment restrictions until the early 1980s. The
industry invested in noncompetitive mines and overproduced in reaction
to its protected status, optimistic nuclear energy demand projections, and
contracting policies of the government. 231 The recession of the industry
reflects merely an adjustment to market conditions rather than a reaction
to import competition.23 2
Domestic demand for civilian reactor fuel is soft. Oil prices at be-
low $20 per barrel have made expensive energy alternatives such as nu-
clear power less attractive.2 33 Continuing problems with waste disposal
234 t . C , Tand reactor design, a near catastrophe at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl
plant, 235 and cost overruns236 have contributed to the decision to cancel
additional reactor orders237 and to the general stalled growth of the do-
231 See Montange, supra note 44, at 20 n.85 ( "Had the Government retained the requirements
contract approach, the problems of surplus inventories and competition from the secondary market
which had so devastating an effect in the early and mid-1980's would never have arisen."). See also
Yokell & De Salvo, supra note 57, at 23.
232 See Gooding, supra note 135.
233 See Woodsworth, supra note 25. Oil company investors in solar energy development are with-
drawing because photovoltaic cells produce power still three times more costly than the most expen-
sive electricity. Wald, U.S. Companies Losing Interest in Solar Energy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1989, at
1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). Low-cost fossil fuels have also hurt efforts at improving energy efficiency. Wald,
US Progress in Energy Effciency Halting, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). Use of
the fusion reaction for electricity generation may still be decades off, despite some recent excitement.
Broad, At Conference on Cold Fusion, the Verdict is Negative, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989, at 19, col. 1
(nat'l ed.).
234 See Wald, Inefficiency Downfall of Safe Reactor, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1988, at 15, col. 1 (nat'l
ed.).
235 The plant fire and the delay in the Soviet warning and response sparked an international
outcry. The Soviets have cancelled construction of a comparable plant, and a similarly constructed
weapons plant in the United States may be shut down as a consequence. See Keller, Soviet Scraps a
New Atomic Plant in Face of Protest over Chernobyl, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (nat'l
ed.)("until today's report, the explosion seemed, in the view of Western analysts, to have set back
Western nuclear power programs more severely than the Soviet program"); Wald, Energy Officials
Back Shutdown of Atomic Plant, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at 1, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
236 See Wald, Nuclear Plant Drain Put at $100 Billion for U.S., N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1988, at 21,
col. 1 (nat'l ed.)("It will cost the nation's economy as much as $100 billion for nuclear plants that
were abandoned before completion or finished at excessive cost."); Daniels, Bankruptcy Filed by
Leading Utility in Seabrook Plant, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1988, at 1, col. 6 (nat'l ed.).
237 See supra note 73. However, new streamlined licensing procedures may reduce one barrier to
on-budget construction cost. New Rules for Licensing Nuclear Plants Likely to Spark Watchdog
Groups, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1989, at C19, col. 2 (midwest ed.).
Uranium Enrichment Policies
10:150(1989)
mestic nuclear industry. These factors, coupled with the return of a re-
quirements contract for enrichment services,2 38 have kept uranium
demand at low levels.2 39 Even military demand may be reduced by the
thaw in East-West relations and until health, safety and waste problems
at weapons plants can be resolved.2'
The existence of stockpiles and a secondary market means that ura-
nium consumers need not purchase newly extracted uranium. Utilities
have stockpiled four to five years worth of their uranium needs.241 More
importantly, the DOE has amassed significantly greater amounts of ura-
nium for military uses on behalf of the Department of Defense
(DOD).242 Though the exact amount is classified, estimates run between
forty years strategic supply,2 43 and a worst-case scenario in which de-
fense purchases would be required by the early 1990s.44
Domestic uranium demand, however, probably will not be fiat indef-
initely. The public has increasingly become concerned over the problems
associated with the use of fossil fuels-smog, acid rain, the greenhouse
effect, and the rapid depletion of these fuels. By contrast, nuclear power
remains the only proven large-scale domestic energy alternative.24 5 Nu-
clear power capacity abroad continues to grow,246 and the United States
238 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
239 See Low Cost U Still Available at Right Terms, NUCLEARFUEL, Feb. 20 1989, at 1 ("The
market continues to frustrate analysts who are surprized by how much suppliers are willing to cut
prices to get utilities' business.").
240 Butterfield, Dispute on Wastes Poses Threat to Weapons Plant, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21,1988, at 1,
col. I (nat'l ed.); Butterfield, Nuclear Arms Industry Eroded As Science Lost Leading Role, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 4 (nat'l ed.); Schneider, Bomb Plant Flaws Known to Du Pont and
U.S. for Years, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1989, at 1, col. 3 (nat'l ed.). Advances in arms control will
reduce demand for raw materials for weapons systems and naval propulsion. Schneider, New Cracks
Found in Arms Reactor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1989, at 8, col. I (nat'l ed.).
241 At the end of 1987, U.S. utilities carried a 137.4 million pound inventory. DOE Received
Record Amount of Foreign U in 1987 to Enrich for U.S. Utilities, NUCLEARFUEL, Oct. 17, 1988, at 9.
This is equivalent to an estimated 20 billion barrel strategic petroleum reserve. 134 CONG. REC.
53337 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988)(statement of Sen. Bradley).
242 If the government enrichment corporation is created, the federal stockpile would be entirely
set aside for the military. Analysis of S 2443, reprinted in 134 CONG. Rac. S 11,077 (daily ed. Aug. 8,
1988)[hereinafter S. 2443 Analysis].
243 See 134 CONG. REC. S3327 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988)(Statement of Sen. Evans)(if entire DOE
stockpile set aside for military, supply would last until 2030). The DOE estimated a thirty-year
supply. FTA Implementation Hearings, supra note 132, at 102 (statement of William Martin, Dep-
uty Sec'y, DOE).
244 134 CONG. REc. S3332 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988)(testimony of Robert Luke, President, Ura-
nium Producers Association)("There have been no government uranium purchases since 1970 and
defense requirements are classified. However, we have been advised by DOE that in the DOD high
case scenario, new U.S. government uranium procurement could be necessary by the early 1990s.").
245 See Behrmann, Uranium Prices Could Gradually Head Higher on Possibility of 1990s Shortage,
Specialists Say, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1988, at C13, col. I (midwest ed.).
246 Approximately forty-seven reactors are under construction outside of the United States and
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is still producing and even exporting uranium.24 7 The domestic uranium
mining and milling industry is not a "senile" industry-one that has irre-
trievably lost its comparative cost advantage to foreign competition-and
thus only needing protection on a "phase out" basis.24 8 The domestic
uranium industry will survive, albeit on a smaller scale, after adjustment
to market conditions. The USTR has projected that it will be "stabilized
out from the oversupply situation" at a 40% to 45% civilian market
share by the mid 1990s.2 4 9 This significant civilian production could be
diverted to the military, if necessary, and replaced by Canadian uranium
whose continued unrestricted flow into the United States is guaranteed
by the FTA. Thus, preservation of an inefficient industry is not required
in the name of national defense.25° The industry can stand on its own.
Nevertheless, the fear remains that if defense stockpiles dwindle,
and foreign supplies are interrupted, that because of the weakened condi-
tion of the uranium industry, the DOD will be left without uranium in
the event of a national security emergency. 251 This argument is coun-
tered most powerfully by the physical characteristics of uranium and the
proximity and political stability of foreign suppliers.
The United States has significant stockpiles of uranium which it can
use until it revives dormant mines.252 Uranium expert Thomas Neff dis-
tinguished the vulnerability of uranium supplies from those of fluid fuel:
Uranium is not like oil or natural gas: disruptions of supply take several
years, not days or weeks, to be felt. Inventories held by U.S. utilities, the
U.S. government, foreign utilities and allied governments are high-
amounting to, perhaps five years of forward supply-and both the U.S. and
international industries have demonstrated a capability to expand output
very rapidly (doubling output in the 1970's in only four years).
2 53
A perceptive Congress foreshadowed these conclusions in 1964:
[T]he Government's inventories of source and special nuclear materials rep-
Soviet Union, with projections of a one-third rise in worldwide nuclear power generating capacity by
the year 2000. Lamphier, Cameco is Poised for Uranium Recovery, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1989, at B7,
col. 1 (midwest ed.)[hereinafter Lamphier]. See also France Stands by Nuclear Power, N.Y. Times,
May 8, 1989, at 26, col. I (nat'l ed.). Uranium producers hopefully are wary of overoptimistic
energy projections.
247 See Canadian, Australian Officials Charge Japan's Uranium Deals With U.S. Unfair,
NUCLEARFUEL, Nov. 14, 1988, at 1.
248 See H. GRAY, supra note 55, at 63.
249 FFA Energy Hearings, supra note 110, at 204 (statement of Robert Reinstein, USTR).
250 Id. at 205. See Santos, supra note 202, at 294.
251 See FTA Oversight Hearings, supra note 128, at 245 (statement of J. Adams, Chairman of the
Board, Energy Fuels Corp.).
252 See Editorial, Why Protect Uranium?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1988, at A18, col. 1 (midwest
ed.)("ore can always be recovered from mothballed domestic mines").
253 Neff, U.S. Uranium in International Perspective (1985), reprinted in 134 CONG. REc. S3328
(daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988)(emphasis added).
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resent a precious national asset. Unlike other materials which are perisha-
ble... the uranium inventory represents a vast nonperishable asset with
intrinsic value in units of usable energy. Wisely managed, it can contribute
to the common defense and security and to the welfare of the Nation.
254
Canada and Australia have large proven uranium reserves. Use of
this high-grade, inexpensive uranium255 not only benefits utility ratepay-
ers,2" 6 but also allows domestic uranium to remain stored in situ, avail-
able for future defense or civilian needs.257 Neither country, because of
their nonproliferation objectives, allows their foreign customers to use
their exported uranium for military purposes.2"' Thus, all domestic ura-
nium production can, if necessary, be reserved for defense purposes.
Neither country is likely to be susceptible to the type of political up-
heaval which has disrupted supply lines in the past in the Middle East.25 9
Canadian supply, comprising the lion's share of U.S. imports, is guaran-
teed through the FTA and never need leave the shores of North
America. There is no longer any merit to the contention that maintain-
ing domestic civilian output through civilian market restrictions is neces-
sary to protect military supply.
Uranium for military purposes is not at issue here. The text of the
FTA's energy section and security exception bear this out. The United
States has never officially claimed that GATT article XXI excepted sec-
tion 161(v) enrichment restrictions from GATT's reach. Because of the
commercial uses of uranium in the United States, it is doubtful that the
government could make such a claim with any future trade restric-
tions.2 "0 No country has ever claimed that any fuel or mineral comes
254 See L964 REPORT, supra note 17, at 3122.
255 Canada's uranium giant Cameco produces uranium at a cost of $8 per pound, compared to
$20 per pound for the average domestic producer, and holds some of the richest ore bodies in the
world. Lamphier, supra note 246. Other foreign producers realize substantial cost savings because
they mine uranium in conjunction with the extraction of other minerals.
256 In fact, domestic producers sometimes find it cost effective to fill orders by purchasing foreign
uranium for resale. See 1986 Criteria, supra note 87, at 27,135. This inconsistency in the uranium
producers' position did not escape attention in the Western Nuclear litigation. Australia Brief, supra
note 58, at 13 n.1l.
257 This position was first articulated in the natural gas context during World War II. See Fed-
eral Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 326 U.S. 591, 657 (1943)(Jackson, J., concur-
ring)("Both producers and industrial consumers have served their immediate private interest at the
expense of long range public interest. The public interest... requires stopping unjust impoverish-
ment of future generations"). See also 1966 Hearings, supra note 55, at 138-139 (statement of Roger
Coe & Harvey Wagner, Edison Electric Inst.)(problem may shift from needing to maintain a viable
domestic industry to conserving an irreplaceable resource.).
258 134 CONG. REC. SI 1,074 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988) (statement of Sen. Ford).
259 There is a possibility that changes in public policy in these countries would result in a cut-off
of exports, but this seems unlikely as uranium contributes to a more favorable balance of trade for
these countries. See S 2443 Analysis, supra note 242.
260 Canada Brief, supra note 58, at 10-11 n.13.
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under the cover of the national security exception." '2 61 Moreover, re-
course to an exception to GATT may require compensation to affected
trading partners so that "other sectors of the U.S. economy would be
asked to make sacrifices for any short-term relief provided for the ura-
nium industry." ' If compensation could not be agreed upon in such
cases, GATT-sanctioned trade retaliation could result.263 Misuse of
blanket exceptions such as article XXI threatens the sometimes tenuous
GATT arrangement.264 Rather than wasting goodwill within the GATT
contract to protect an ailing industry that will eventually stabilize, use of
this exception should be limited to situations that directly threaten mili-
tary operations or other important national security concerns.265
Because uranium trade will never be wrestled completely free from
military and political exigencies, government policies in producer and
consumer countries will continue to distort the market.2 66 Yet sheltering
the U.S. industry under the security rationale is now a red herring.
267
Even as enrichment restrictions were being phased out, one uranium pro-
261 GATT signatories invoke the national security exception "very infrequently because of its
potential for abuse." Letter from Ambassador Clayton Yeutter (USTR) to Cong. Morris Udall (July
15, 1985), reprinted in Australia Brief, supra note 58, at 15 n.12[hereinafter Yeutter-Udall Letter].
262 Reinstein Declaration, supra note 98.
263 Yeutter-Udall Letter, supra note 261.
264 The United States attitude toward GATT has been sharply criticized over the years:
[T]he American policy of totally ignoring its GATT obligations when it is politically expedient
to do so is unsettling to many of its trading partners. By its actions, the United States has
explicitly repudiated its undertakings to use trade restraints only within a GATT-approved
context, and has caused open doubt to be cast on its commitment to free trade principles ....
The clear absence of any credible GATT defense in these circumstances underscores the con-
tempt which others perceive the United States holds for the General Agreement. This is not an
academic debate about technical interpretations contained in GATT Articles XIX, XX, and
XXI; the United States does not offer any GATT explanation of what it has done-probably
because there is none.
deKieffer, Foreign Policy Trade Controls and the GA7T, J. WORLD TRADE 73, 78-79 (1988). See
also Dullforce, Gatt's Future on Line in Trade Talks, Fin. Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at 4, col. 5 ("at
stake are GATIT's own future role as the arbiter of international trade and ultimately the prospects
for free trade at a time when industrialists and politicians, notably in the U.S. are calling for protec-
tionist action to counter their trade problems").
265 The economic and political benefits of nondiscriminatory trade may be able to survive special-
ized departures, however. "National security trade controls, for example, are universally recognized
in theory and practice; nondiscrimination can easily coexist with the kind of controls permitted by
moderate interpretation of article XXI." Abbott, supra note 11, at 855.
266 Gooding, supra note 135 (politics and nonprolifration concerns have greatest market influ-
ence, and thus market price does not reflect real cost). For a more extreme view, see 134 CONG.
REC. S3345 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988)(statement of Sen Boren):
Uranium is a highly political mineral. This is due to the concern about non-proliferation and
other nuclear weapons issues. These concerns overwhelm the importance of uranium as a fuel
for electricity. It follows that the world of international uranium trade is, and always will be,
dominated by political issues and government policies-not by uranium producers and traders.
"Free trade" in uranium is only a theory. In the real world, governments set uranium policies.
267 The current duty-free status of uranium renders the national security argument even less per-
suasive. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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ducer urged that "the best interests of the United States will be served by
the domestic uranium industry operating within a free, competitive mar-
ket." 6 ' The uranium industry has already fallen victim to its own pro-
tection. The futility of future protection should be apparent.169
The United States should carry on its international trade in uranium
intended for use in civilian reactors in a market governed by GATT
norms,2 70 subject of course to safety and nonproliferation limitations, 71
until safer, cheaper, and less consumptive large scale energy sources can
be found.
James R. Wilch
268 Industry Splits and Diplomats Join the Fray as Hearings Open on Uranium Import Limits,
NUCLEARFUEL, Oct. 12, 1981, at 4. Most producers, however, take the opposite view:
Free trade is an admirable proposition and is, in theory, necessary for the orderly exchange of
needs among the people of the world. However, it is extremely difficult to make a strong case
that free trade exists between nations in the area of energy supplies .... Uranium since its
beginnings as a tradeable commodity, has historically been a highly politicized and government-
controlled energy fuel.
Embargo Jibes with GAT, Proponents Say, NUCLEARFUEL, June 7, 1982, at 14.
269 Protection always requires a quid pro quo for the affected trading partners, and usually leads
to inefficiency in the protected industry and general welfare loss. For example, in order to achieve
voluntary restraint agreements for steel imports, the United States had to promise not to challenge
dumping practices of foreign suppliers, which protected inefficient practices on both sides. An esti-
mated 17,000 steel industry jobs were saved, but at an estimated cost of 52,000 jobs in other sectors.
See Editorial, Steel's Costly Crunch, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1989, at 22, col. 1 (nat'l ed.). Prices
increased and shortages were created. Hicks, Effort Begun to Extend Limits on Steel Imports, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 13, 1989, at 20, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
270 GATT members have begun negotiations at the Uruguay Round to liberalize trade in natural
resourses and energy products, including uranium. Nelson, GA 2TNations Settle Dispute Imperiling
Talks, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1989, at A3, col. 1 (Midwest ed.). They also agreed to limit the condi-
tions under which Contracting Parties can protect industries from import surges.
271 Non-proliferation efforts are aided by freer trade, as it becomes easier to keep track of who is
buying and selling uranium.
A lack of legitimate market opportunities would tempt some producers to make further clandes-
tine sales of uranium (like that of Niger to Libya in 1981) to nations or groups with no legiti-
mate uses for material. The existence of "old fashioned" uranium-based routes to weapons,
aggrevated by the increasing availability of enrichment technologies, makes this a serious dan-
ger. Thus, healthy international commercial markets, with significant U.S. participation, may
be one of the best safeguards policies available to the United States.
Neff, supra note 253, at S3329.

